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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 2, n.º 2 (Outono 2011), pp. 77-95

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MEDIATION OF

VIOLENT INTRA-STATE CONFLICT: THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN

THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE MOZAMBICAN PEACE PROCESS

Carlos Branco

email: branco.cmm@gmail.com

Major-General of the Portuguese Army

Abstract

This essay discusses the role of NGOs in the mediation of violent intra-state conflicts. Based

on the analysis of the Mozambican peace process, we tried to understand if informal actors

and NGOs in particular would be best suited to mediate this type of conflict, as advocated by

some. Against this current of thought, the author argues that official diplomacy still remains

the most appropriate tool to lead the mediation of violent intra-state conflicts. In cases

where multiple resources are used (multi-track), as was the case in Mozambique, formal

actors and states, in particular, continued to play a decisive and unavoidable role because

they had the resources that were not available to informal players. Informal diplomacy can

complement formal diplomacy, but cannot replace it, and will always play a secondary and

supporting role.

Keywords

Non-Governmental Organizations; conflict mediation; mediation strategies; Mozambican

conflict; Community of San’tEgidio; Track One and a Half Diplomacy; Track One Diplomacy;

Track Two Diplomacy; untreatable conflicts

How to cite this article

Branco, Carlos (2011). "Non-Governmental Organizations in the mediation of

violent intra-state conflict: the confrontation between theory and practive in the

mozambican peace process”. JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, Vol.

2, N.º 2, Autumn 2011.

Accessed

[online] on date of last view,

observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol2_n2_art4

Article received on December 2010 and accepted for publication on September 2011

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 2, n.º 2 (Autumn 2011), pp. 77-95

Non-Governmental Organizations in the mediation of violent intra-state conflict

Carlos Branco

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MEDIATION OF

VIOLENT INTRA-STATE CONFLICT: THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN

THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE MOZAMBICAN PEACE PROCESS

Carlos Branco

Introduction

In the past two decades, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have tried to further

their involvement in the field of conflict resolution. Some authors advocate that action

should be extended to the whole spectrum of conflict resolution, from prevention to

peacebuilding, and include participation in formal mediation processes (Tongeren,

2005; Baharvar, 2001)

, what Susan Allen Nan called Track One and a Half Diplomacy

(T1,5D) and described as the intermediation activities carried out by unofficial actors -

including NGOs - with official representatives of a government involved in a conflict,

with the aim of promoting its peaceful resolution (Nan, 1999). The mediation of the

Mozambican peace process that led to agreements in Rome in October 1992, attended

by the Community of Sant'Egidio, is often singled out as an example of what could be

the participation of informal actors, and NGOs in particular, in formal mediation

processes.

Proponents of NGO participation in formal mediation processes argue that the

traditional instruments of negotiation, mediation and conflict management failed in

intractable conflicts (Fisher, 1989; Saunders, 1997); traditional diplomacy has major

limitations and is not suited to this type of conflict, and therefore the solution lies in the

use of informal intermediaries, which are particularly suitable for resolving such

conflicts. Our argument is exactly the opposite. We argue that public diplomacy (T1D)

still remains the most appropriate way to lead the mediation of violent intra-state

conflicts. In cases where multiple resources are used (multitrack), as was the case of

Mozambique, the formal actors and states, in particular, continue to play a decisive and

unavoidable role because they have resources not available to informal players.

Informal diplomacy can complement the formal one, but not replace it.

NGOs’ involvement in mediation of the T1, 5D type has been insufficiently studied. This

work seeks to contribute to the debate and clarification of the topic, analyzing the

validity of the arguments presented by that current of thought. For this purpose, we

use the theoretical formulations about mediation and mediation strategies proposed by

Touval and Zartman (1985), which we will confront with the analysis of the peace

mediation process in Mozambique, as it is repeatedly used as an example of what these

organizations can do in mediation.

In some cases mistakenly called “negotiation”. Negotiation is a two party relationship, whereas mediation

is a relationship involving at least three parties.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

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Non-Governmental Organizations in the mediation of violent intra-state conflict

Carlos Branco

This paper thus has two main objectives: first, try to understand if informal

intermediaries and NGOs in particular, regardless of their origin (national or

international), are the most appropriate type of mediator to conduct the mediation of

violent intra-state conflicts, and, second, in the case of a negative finding, ascertain, in

the light of these theoretical formulations, what kind of actor - States and/or

International Organizations - may be more appropriate to mediate these conflicts

based, in both situations, on the analysis of the Mozambican peace process.

To this end, we start by clarifying what NGOs are, as it is a term with multiple

meanings, for which reason it needs to be explained; subsequently, the theoretical

postulates that act as a reference for understanding the possibilities (capacities versus

limitations) of NGOs, states and international organizations in the field of mediation will

be presented: and, finally, we shall revisit the Mozambican peace process, trying to

explain the reasons for its success and the behaviour of different actors in the light of

the theoretical frameworks presented, which, from our point of view, have a more

complex explanation than that offered by the mainstream, which attributes the merit of

the mediation to the Community of Sant'Egidio.

Non-Governmental Organizations: a Possible Definition

The importance of NGOs at international level has intensified over the past 20 years,

including in what is commonly known as conflict resolution. They have become major

partners in the international response to humanitarian emergencies, abuse and

violations of human rights, and in the efforts to rebuild and reconcile societies affected

by conflicts or natural disasters that prevent normal functioning

. In many cases, they

work as entities subcontracted by the UN, the EU and governments. The large

differences between some of these organizations (interests, organizational and

philosophical dynamics, capacities, access to the sources of power and information,

economic resources, etc...) have hindered a consensus definition. This is coupled by the

fact that the conceptual boundaries are sometimes imprecise. It is not always easy to

distinguish, for example, a civic association or a charity from an NGO.

In the UN system, NGO is any voluntary non-profit entity organized at local, national or

international level, acting of its own will and directed by people united around a

common interest

. In fact, NGOs work to support and protect sectors of society

neglected by governments or official institutions

. Since they are private voluntary

organizations, they may also be called that (PVO)

. NGOs and PVOs acquire legal

personality under the domestic legal regulations (Private Law, and in some cases,

Administrative Law) of the state of origin. Although an NGO may have an eminently

international vocation, the truth is that its legal existence is conditioned by the

The UN report on global governance published in 1995 estimated the existence of twenty nine thousand

international NGOs (INGO). The number of national NGOs is immeasurably higher.

Still on the definition of NGO see also Gonçalves Pereira and Quadros (2000: 402) and Riquito (2001:

206). The World Bank defines NGOs as "private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering,

promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake

community development" (Operational Directive 14.70). In a broader use, the term NGO can be used to

describe a non-profit organization acting independently from governments. NGOS are organizations that

typically depend, entirely or in part, on charity or volunteer work.

Idem. The adopted definition does not include professional and commercial associations or foundations.

For other definitions of NGO see, for instance, Weiss and Gordenker (1996: 18-21) and Aall (2000: 124).

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Carlos Branco

recognition of a state, and its legal personality in international law is not always clear

cut.

With regard to the categorization of NGOs, the proposals advanced by scholars have

not been ruled by consensus either. For example, Weiss and Gordenker (1996: 20)

found four types of NGOs. The first, which is the most orthodox model, coincides with

the one presented earlier; a private organization of citizens separated from

governments, but active in social matters, non-profit and transnational in nature. The

remaining three types, also called "significant deviations" because they are less

autonomous from governments, should therefore be distinguished from what we

commonly call NGOs.

The first, the QUANGO, almost non-governmental organizations, have relative

autonomy, which decreases depending on their financial dependence on governments.

The QUANGO includes organizations contracted by governments that provide

specialized services such as, for example, the case of the International Rescue

Committee

; the second group, called DONG, Donor-Organized Non-Governmental

Organizations, is created for very specific and concrete purposes (e.g., demining in

Afghanistan and support for women); and finally, the GONGOs, Government-Organized

Non-Governmental Organizations, act as true agents of national policies. In the latter

case, it is clear that the actions of NGOs act as the extended hand of a State, for which

reason it is difficult to consider them as an NGO.

The absence of consensus repeats itself when it comes to adopting a taxonomy. Using

the scope of action as a cataloguing criterion

, we can consider an NGO to be any

organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering, promoting education, health

care, economic development, environmental protection, and which monitors compliance

with Human Rights, resolution of conflicts, etc., activities that do not end in this list

(Aall, Miltenberger & Weiss, 2005: 89). Despite the tremendous variety, we can classify

NGOs working in conflict zones in four principal activities: humanitarian assistance,

human rights, building civil and democratic society, and conflict resolution. Their

mandates and activities extend across the different phases of the life cycle of a conflict,

i.e. even before the first signs of violence right through to the consolidation of peace

We shall focus our attention on NGOs that can be included in the more Orthodox

concept, regardless of being organized nationally or internationally. The level at which

an NGO is organized is not negligible; it is necessary to pay attention to the

implications this may have in mediating a violent conflict. They are entities that are

essentially different in terms of resources and knowledge of the societies affected by

conflicts, for which reason they require a different treatment. National NGOs stem from

For further information on the International Rescue Committee please see the following website

http://www.theirc.org.

As NGOs vary widely regarding their purpose, philosophy, knowledge and scope of activity, it is possible

to classify them according to various types, depending on: their main vocation to provide emergency,

assistance or development; their religious or secular inspiration; their priority (delivery or participation);

or the priority given to the type of activities it supports (public or private).

Still on this subject, Ian Gary, for instance, classifies NGOs both regarding the methods and the scope of

activities, considering two categories in both cases. As for the method, we have the hands off, which

work behind the scenes, such as providing counselling services, and the hands on, which carry out

activities on the ground. As for scope, we have the ad hoc organizations, whose mission is to contain the

conflict and mitigate its effects; and those with systemic functions to intervene in the process of

transforming mentalities and institutions. See GARY, I., “Confrontation, Co-operation or Co-optation:

NGO’s and the Ghanaian State During Structure Adjustment”, in Review of African Political Economy, 23

(68), 1996: 149-169.

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Carlos Branco

civil society and have information networks, contacts and knowledge of the society in

which they operate and that are very different from large international NGOs. Our

study focuses on NGOs that are primarily dedicated to conflict resolution, regardless of

whether they develop activities in other areas

Mediation and Mediation Strategies

Before advancing to present different types of mediators and mediation strategies, we

must clarify two crucial issues: first, the meaning of a Track 1 Diplomacy (T1D - formal

official mediation) and Track 2 Diplomacy (T2D - informal/unofficial mediation), in order

to ascertain whether T1D can be advantageously replaceable by other forms of

mediation such as T1, 5D (already explained) or T2D, and if states are replaceable by

other NGOs or informal actors in the management of violent conflict

; and, secondly,

the need to adapt those concepts to intra-state conflicts. In many cases, we cannot talk

of governments but only of the leaders of different factions, which often do not hold

any office in the hierarchy of the State.

The term Track 1 Diplomacy (TD1) refers to official governmental diplomacy, or "the

action technique of a government that primarily is a process whereby the

communication made by a government addresses directly the decision making

mechanisms of the other government" (Lerche, S ., Lerche, C. and Said, A., 1994). It is

conducted by the official representatives of a State and involves interaction with the

other State (or with the top leaders of the litigant factions). The term Track 2

Diplomacy (T2D) has to do with unofficial interactions, informal contacts between

members of adversary groups or nations, and these interactions are aimed at conflict

resolution

. The T2D is an area that is home to several concepts and terms, such as

Interactive Conflict Resolution, Analytical Resolution of Problems workshops, sustained

dialogue, and the so-called multilevel peace processes.

Mediation of the T1, 5D types takes place directly between unofficial mediators and top

decision makers of the parties, but also with influential elements of society or the group

in conflict. With top decision makers, it is direct mediation, consultation and facilitation

of the inter-active resolution of problems carried out by unofficial mediators; with the

influential citizens of society, the intention is to facilitate the resolution of problems

and/or develop confidence-building measures. As we can see, the techniques used in

T1, 5D and in T2D are similar and in some cases the same. However, there is a

relevant difference that separates the two concepts, which has to do with the nature of

the actors involved: in the case of T1, 5D, the lead actors of the parties are key

decision-makers, while in T2D they are influential groups in society, or people who are

expected to become so.

The theory of conflict resolution establishes various types of mediators and mediation

strategies. The multiplicity of actors that can act as mediators is huge, from individuals,

government officials, highly prestigious politicians and religious leaders, regional

Many NGOs working primarily in areas of action other than conflict resolution also claim the right to be

involved in that activity.

In the present paper we shall use the conflict management definition proposed by Zartman and which is

the elimination of violence and of forms related to violence in dealing with a conflict, allowing the

resolution to be made at political level. In other words, to have violent demonstrations replaced by

political events, in order to solve, transform and remove the causes of conflict (ZARTMAN, 1997: 11).

FISHER, R.J., 1997: 261.

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Carlos Branco

actors, NGOs and international organizations, ad hoc groups, and states, each of them

bringing their trading interests, perceptions and resources into the negotiation process

(Bercovitch, 1997). The mediation strategy to be adopted by a mediator always reflects

those elements, which differ substantially whether it is an individual, states, institutions

or organizations

. Taking into account the scope of work, we will focus our attention

just on the characteristics of formal mediation conducted by States and

institutions/organizations - which include regional and international informal

organizations and are carried out by the NGOs.

Of the various types of mediation strategies proposed by academics, we adopted the

one developed by Zartman and Touval and which considers three behaviour categories,

to be considered taken in ascending and gradual form, and which can describe in a

comprehensive manner the actions of mediators: communicative, formulative and

manipulative (Touval and Zartman, 1985). The adoption of a particular strategy does

not mean that they carry out all tasks that it enshrines. Just a few of them are enough.

Higher level task strategies typically include low-level strategies.

In communicative strategies, the mediator may behave in one or more of the

following forms: establish contacts among the parties, earn their trust and confidence,

look for ways to put them in contact, identify issues and interests underlying the

dispute, and help clarify the situation. In this type of strategy, mediators avoid taking

sides, try to empathize with litigants and provide them with important information that

they do not possess. They can also transmit messages between the parties,

encouraging them to begin a fruitful communication and ensure the interests of all of

them are discussed.

Formulative strategies are more demanding than communicative ones, both for

mediators and the parties. Besides some typical behaviours of communication

strategies, formulating mediators can choose the locations of the negotiation rounds,

control their pace and formality (the regiment), and control the underlying physical

involvement in the negotiations; ensure the privacy of the mediation, suggest

procedures, emphasize the common interests of the parties, reduce tensions, and

control the times when the meetings should occur. According to this

action rationale, the mediator who adopts a formulative strategy should, in the first

place, deal with common problems, structure the agenda, help establish the conditions

for building an acceptable outcome for the litigants; help them to save face (when

applicable), maintain the negotiation process focused on critical issues, not letting it

slip into unnecessary secondary quarrels, make proposals and fruitful suggestions, and

suggest concessions that litigants may have to do.

At the top of strategies we find the manipulative ones, the most demanding of the

three for both mediators and the parties. In addition to what has already been

mentioned for the two previous strategies, manipulative mediators may still have the

responsibility to keep the parties at the negotiating table, exercise their action in order

to alter their expectations about the possible terms of an agreement and, at the same

time, raise awareness of the cost of the absence of it. The manipulative mediator is

also responsible for providing and filtering the information to be given; helping to undo

previous commitments, rewarding parties who make the concessions, pressing them to

A mediation strategy is considered to be a plan, approach or methods that a mediator resorts to in order

to resolve a dispute (Kolb, 1983: 24), in Bercovitch, op. cit.: 136.

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be flexible, promising them resources or threatening to end the negotiation process;

offering to verify compliance with the agreements; adding incentives or threatening

with punishment, and threatening to withdraw from the mediation.

The choice to adopt a certain behaviour or follow a mediation strategy and not another

is not a fluke. It is influenced by specific factors pertaining to the conflict or the

mediator. There are many factors that may determine the choice of a strategy. But to

be effective, the mediation strategy and the mediator's behaviour must be consistent

with their interests and the nature of the conflict (Bercovitch, 1997). According to

Bercovitch, practice has shown, for example, that communicative mediation strategies

tend to be more effective in low intensity conflicts, while manipulative strategies are

more successful in high-intensity conflicts

. But on the other hand, to be effective,

mediation strategies, as well as reflecting the reality of the conflict, must also mirror

the features of the mediator. Manipulative mediators are not those who want to be so,

but those who can be so.

Despite the fact that the scientific community has not reached consensus on the most

effective mediation strategies - some argue that the communication- facilitation

strategies are so (Burton 1969; Kelman 1992) - statistical data indicate that tougher

mediation strategies of the formulative-manipulative type (Touval and Zartman 1985)

produce better results.

Bercovitch also examined the characteristics of the three classes of mediators:

individuals, states and institutions/organizations. Individual mediators represent

themselves (academics, former heads of state, prominent figures from international

organizations, etc...), and officially they represent nothing; they are not members of a

government and do not hold political office. The informal mediation usually begins

when the mediators are involved in a conflict on their own initiative. Acting individually,

the action of these mediators is based solely on communication strategies and

facilitation

concerned primarily with the quality of the interaction between the parties

and the creation of an enabling environment for the management of the conflict

. This

type of mediation could be extremely useful to support a future formal mediation, in

many cases opening the door to formal talks. The suggestions and ideas that arise in

T2D can be brought to the negotiating table of T1D.

When it comes to mediation conducted by states, one must begin by distinguishing

between large and small. Due to their small size and apparent lack of power or

influence, small states do not represent a threat to the parties and are generally very

well positioned to mediate, and they normally wait to be invited to do so. When they

intervene, they tend to confine their activities to regional conflicts, and their strategies

tend to be, in most cases, strategies based on dialogue and communication. Small

states are very useful in this type of mediation

For the big states, the motivation to mediate is usually different; they use mediation as

a vehicle to protect or promote their interests

. By offering a wide array of resources,

the range of strategies available to them increases, and they can select the ones that

suit them, a situation that is not within the reach of small states. They can use a

Idem: 138.

Ibidem: 140.

Ibidem: 147.

Ibidem: 142.

Ibidem, Bercovitch quoting Touval: 142.

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variety of stimuli (positive or negative), generate and guide the impetus of negotiations

towards an agreement; and even alter their motivations, behaviours and expectations.

More than any other actors, states are able to gather the necessary resources for the

success of a mediation process. They have leverage and use the political and social

influence at their disposal to persuade litigants to make concessions and reshape their

strategic objectives towards an agreement.

The participation of international and regional organizations in mediation processes has

also been subject of study. In 1994, Touval published an article in Foreign Affairs about

the limitations of the UN in the field of mediation, in which he stated that the

mediations conducted by that organization are successful only when the belligerents

are exhausted and powers outside the conflicts have no willingness to continue to

support their customers, whose usefulness has been exhausted with the end of the

Cold War

. But Touval goes further and generalizes about the conclusions concerning

the behaviour of the UN as a mediator to international organizations, saying that, in

general, they have inherent characteristics that make them unable to be effective

mediators in complex international disputes

Touval states that international organizations have great difficulty in carrying out some

basic functions required of an effective mediator, due to the absence of significant

political leverage over the parties, the lack of credibility of their promises and the

negotiation inflexibility resulting from their slow and complex decision-making

processes. These limitations are embedded in their DNA and are part of the intrinsic

nature of international organizations. And nobody can change this reality.

International organizations mediate solely on the terms of the states they are part of,

and only with the material and diplomatic resources they are provided with

Multilateral talks require a consultation and coordination process between the members

of these organizations. A mediator must be able to influence belligerents in order to get

them to change their positions. It requires, above all, leverage, which is derived from

the military and economic resources that the great powers have in abundance, and that

regional or international organizations do not have, being at the mercy of the good will

of the States that compose them. The UN cannot even use the tools of international

financial institutions and trade. In order to do so, it continues to depend on the

decisions of the Member States. The problem of lack of resources and leverage also

applies to all informal mediators.

Their vulnerabilities are perceived and exploited by the belligerents, who doubt their

ability to fulfil both their promises of support and their threats of punishment. Due to

decision systems that are peculiar to them, it is very difficult for international

organizations to conduct dynamic negotiations, respond quickly, seize opportunities,

and have the flexibility to adjust positions and proposals that will enable them to

conveniently monitor the course of events. Once they have adopted a mediation

strategy, it is not easy to change it so as to respond quickly to changing situations.

TOUVAL, Saadia (1994). “Why the UN Fails”, Foreign Affairs, September/October: 44.

Idem: 45.

However, this does not mean that international organizations and the UN, in particular, cannot play an

important role, especially when their action is coordinated with the efforts of states. There are other

reasons, namely to serve as a cushion and thus protect states from damages that may be caused by

failed peacemaking processes.

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International organizations only adopt measures around which consensus can be built,

reflecting the logic of the lowest common denominator

International organizations are particularly useful as facilitators of communication

between the parties, helping a greater understanding of opposing positions and

clarifying their concerns, but are not designed for difficult disputes. International

organizations do not have the conditions to carry out manipulative mediation

strategies.

NGOs do not have the legitimacy of international organizations to mediate, and their

behaviour in the mediation of violent conflicts is similar to that of other informal

mediators. Using the argument rationale stated before, unlike states, and due to the

fact they have very limited resources, NGOs have a very tiny number of strategies at

their fingertips, the alternatives being confined to communication and facilitation

strategies guided to quality-oriented interaction between the parties and to maintaining

an environment conducive to conflict management. The fact that they will now talk to

key decision-makers - a T1, 5 procedure - does not change this reality. Like the states,

they will hardly have the ability to change the behaviour, expectations and strategic

objectives of the parties in conflict.

To achieve this, it was necessary to have a persuasiveness that does not exhaust itself

in dialogue and communication. To influence the course of a violent conflict, mediation

cannot be limited to generating and sharing information; it has to use more assertive

strategies that can alter the way the parties think and interact

. On the other hand, we

must take into account the environment in which mediation takes place. The

management of violent conflict has assumed as an environment of violence and

widespread insecurity, not very conducive to interactive conflict resolution or conflict

resolution workshops, which is substantially different from the environment that we live

in a situation of peacebuilding, violent post-conflict, in a stable security situation more

favourable to NGO activities.

The fact that the mediator is a national or international NGO has different meanings.

The range of civil society involvement in mediation processes, especially through NGOs

emanating from that same society, must be carefully evaluated. It is an appealing idea

that falls apart because the violent conflicts that are the focus of this intervention

usually occur in pre-modern societies, without an active civil society, or in more

developed societies in which civil society organizations have been destroyed by

violence, reducing the ability to influence whatever it may be to the smallest

possibility

. The chance of giving them relief in the midst of a violent conflict is merely

a fanciful construction. It is well intentioned but useless, as experience has shown over

and over again.

TOUVAL, Saadia, op. cit.: 53.

Idem: 146.

The Bosnian conflict is a flagrant example of this situation. The attempt to promote the Muslim secular

alternative led by Adil Zulfikarpasic and Muhamed Filipovic, the extremism of the party led by Izetbegovic

did not work, and crumbled in the sectarianism that permeated society in the beginning of the 1990s. An

identical situation occurred in Somalia at the same time.

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The Mediation of the Conflict in Mozambique: Actors and Strategies

Once the theoretical framework that is necessary for our analysis has been presented,

we shall move on to the case study, identifying the actors involved in the mediation,

their role and the strategies adopted by each of them. We resorted to the book by

Cameron Hume, "Ending Mozambique's War", in which the author makes a detailed

chronology of the peace talks and provides crucial clues to our understanding of the

role and strategies adopted by the different players

But before we proceed, we must insert the Mozambican conflict in the historical context

and in the international and regional policy framework that existed in the late eighties.

Neither super-powers nor neighbouring countries supported the continuation of the

war. With the end of the Cold War and, consequently, the end of the links which each

of the factions maintained with the great powers, the political and financial support to

the war effort came to an end. In 1990, no government in the region was prepared to

maintain and support its allies in Mozambique. The regional political situation had

become conducive to conflict resolution. Exhausted and without resources, both

contenders were aware that they were unable to win the conflict; the situation was at a

point that Touval and Zartman called a painful stalemate. It was a situation that was

ripe for mediation and, therefore, favourable to the success of mediation.

The choice of mediator was the first obstacle that had to be overcome. The selection

would have to fall on someone who enjoyed the trust of both parties. Chissano wanted

direct talks without the intervention of mediators, which Dhlakama opposed. For

Chissano, the role of external players should be limited to good offices. For his part,

Dhlakama wanted Mozambican bishops to act as mediators.

After several mishaps and failed initiatives, with the agreement of the Vatican and the

diplomatic and financial support of the Italian Government, the Community of

Sant'Egidio hosted the first round of negotiations that took place at its headquarters in

Rome in July 1990. This round of negotiations was attended by three entities. In

addition to the Sant'Egidio Community, it had the participation of the Mozambican

churches and of the Italian Government.

Each party was represented in the group which, at the time still had observer status

and was later to become the mediation group: The Community of Sant'Egidio

represented by Don Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppa, the Episcopal Conference

represented by D. Jaime Goncalves, and the Italian Government, represented by Mario

Raffaelli. This group remained unchanged until the end of the talks.

At the end of the first round of negotiations, Ambassador Raffaelli gave an interview to

Vatican Radio explaining the roles played by the Governments of Kenya and Zimbabwe,

giving them credit for reconciling the positions of the parties which led to direct talks.

In practice, these were possible due to the combined action of various actors - the

Italian Government, the Community of Sant'Egidio and the Church in Mozambique

Hume was number 2 in the hierarchical chain of the U.S. mission to the Vatican at the time peace talks

were underway in Rome. In parallel, he was an observer and an active participant in the peace process.

HUME, Cameron (1994). Ending the Mozambique’s War. The Role of Mediation and Good Offices,

Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace: 35.

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Failing to agree about the African state to invite as mediator, the parties eventually

agreed on the solution of the four observers, who, in practice, had worked as mediators

(the mediation would be a collective action).

The mediation solution found enabled overcoming the obstacles placed by both the

government and RENAMO. This formulation suited the wishes of the Government, which

wanted a mediator who had a minor role and no manipulative ability, and the mediation

requirements of RENAMO, i.e., a mediator rather than bilateral negotiations. As neither

the Church nor the Community of Sant'Egidio followed a strategy of own mediation, we

will examine only the strategy adopted by the mediation group where this NGO was

represented. The participation of the Italian government in peace talks must be

analyzed separately.

There were many actors who contributed to reach the Peace Agreement signed in Rome

on 4 October 1992. In addition to the mediation group consisting of representatives of

churches in Mozambique, the Community of Sant'Egidio and the Italian Government,

the collaboration of several states must equally be taken into account. The involvement

of two particularly active governments, although with different roles, Italy and the U.S.,

must be highlighted. Further away, but with an equally important role, came Kenya,

Zimbabwe, and Malawi. At a later stage in the talks when military matters were

discussed, the process was joined by the countries that became observers of the peace

process: France, Portugal, and the UK jointly with the U.S. The UN also joined the talks

with observer status, but its involvement was more oriented to discuss aspects of the

implementation of agreed matters. And finally, Tiny Rowland, an English businessman,

chairman of the Lonrho group, who held strong mining interests in Zimbabwe, and who

made his jets available to mediators and to the parties for the frequent trips they had

to do.

The Churches

Both academics and practitioners have neglected the role of religious elites - Roman

and Anglican - in the management of the Mozambican conflict in their analysis. Their

involvement dates back to 1984, when the first talks were held between the

Government and RENAMO. It was in this context that the Christian Council of

Mozambique (CCM) established the "Commission for Peace and Reconciliation" (CPR) in

order to explore possible opportunities for dialogue and facilitate communication

between the litigants. The CCM continued to act behind the scenes throughout the

second half of the decade without, however, achieving great progress.

The willingness expressed by the Kenyan authorities to mediate a possible peace

process was used by the CCM to dialogue with RENAMO leaders. The peace initiative

promoted by the churches’ leaders became public and Chissano mandated the CPR, led

by Anglican Bishop D. Dinis Sengulane, to negotiate the conditions of an amnesty with

RENAMO leaders. There was the coincidence that the leadership of FRELIMO was mostly

Anglican, while the RENAMO leadership was mostly Catholic

. The year 1988 marked

the beginning of intense diplomatic activity which led to peace in 1992. The ongoing

diplomatic activity did not, however, prevent the continuation of the fighting. In early

HUME, Cameron, op. cit.: 27. “… RENAMO sent another message to the Holy See … explaining that unlike

the FRELIMO leadership, many of us,…including our President, are catholic …”

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1989, the Mozambican church leaders - Catholic and Anglican - launched a second

initiative to explore existing contacts. Cardinal D. Alexandre dos Santos, Archbishop D.

Jaime Gonçalves, Bishop Dinis Sengulane, and Pastor Jeremias Mucache (President of

the CCM) met Chissano to persuade him to initiate dialogue with RENAMO

Chissano agreed that the clergy met with representatives of RENAMO, as long as it took

place outside Mozambique, which indeed happened but without tangible results

. In

1989, echoing the call of the Mozambican clergy, Pope John Paul II publicly called for

national reconciliation. In early 1989, the CCM and the Catholic Archbishop of Maputo

met with representatives of the American faction of RENAMO (RENAMO elements

residing in the United States), and high dignitaries of the Catholic Church in

Mozambique, including D. Jaime Gonçalves, met with Dhlakama without the consent of

Chissano.

However, the insistence of religious leaders turned out to have some positive effect. In

August 1989, at the request of Chissano, Dhlakama was given, in Nairobi, a document

with 12 points, to which Dhlakama replied by giving a 16-point document to be handed

to Chissano

. Chissano resorted to the good offices of the religious leaders as the way

to define the conditions under which he would enter into direct negotiations. Alongside

the good offices of other religious leaders, there were initiatives led by the Kenyan and

American diplomacies which also aimed to convince the parties to enter into direct

negotiations. The commitment of the clergy in bringing peace extended throughout the

negotiating period, and the Mozambican churches were always present in the talks

through D. Jaime Gonçalves, who was a member of the mediation group.

The Community of Sant’Egidio

Based on the results obtained thanks to the good offices of the four religious leaders

and African governments, among which Kenya, Malawi and Zimbabwe stood out, and

by exploring the long-time connections between Archbishop D. Jaime Gonçalves and

the Italian Government

, in July 1990 the Community of Sant'Egidio promoted the first

direct meeting between representatives of FRELIMO and RENAMO in Rome, which

became the epicentre of diplomatic activity. Significant steps towards peace were given

during the negotiations conducted in October and November 1991: FRELIMO and

RENAMO recognized each other and agreed on the future role of the UN; RENAMO’s

right to exercise party political activity was ratified with the signing of the General

Peace Agreement (GPA)

The Community of Sant'Egidio played an important role in creating the physical

conditions for holding the talks. In addition to providing its headquarters and

welcoming the delegations of the parties to the talks, it ensured the political, logistical

and financial support of the Italian Government needed to carry out the talks. It formed

Idem. There had been an earlier initiative in 1988, promoted by President Arap Moi of Kenya who invited

Chissano and Mugabe to a meeting in Nairobi to explore the possibility of negotiations.

Ibidem.

Ibidem: 28.

D. Gonçalves was the key link that led to the Italian mediation. His friendship with members of the

Community of Sant’Egidio went back over 20 years, to the time when he, as a young priest studying in

Rome, became close to that religious organization. A few tears later, he enlisted the help of the

Community to put pressure on the Mozambican government to abdicate its anticlerical stance.

HUME, Cameron, op. cit.: 79.

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part of the mediation group with two representatives, one of them its president. Using

the words of Chester Crocker, the people of Sant'Egidio made history through their

initial involvement. Their efforts created a critical mass of facts and a momentum which

gave formal decision-makers (T1D) a case to support

. However, in terms of

negotiations, the involvement of the community was small.

The Mediation Group

The mediation strategy adopted by the mediation group was of the communicative

type. The group helped to maintain the dialogue between the parties and ensured that

the relations of hostility and animosity were transformed into relations of cooperation,

helping reconciliation through dialogue of the parties. In addition to the good offices

given throughout the negotiation process, the mediation group made proposals and

helped litigants to find alternatives.

The use of shuttling diplomacy was a recurring practice not only with delegations of the

factions in Rome, as elsewhere with the top leaders of the parties, with the aim of

agreeing on meeting agendas and on the sequence of issues to be discussed, or to

unlock more complex situations which the heads of delegations in Rome had no

delegated authority to do. For example, the mediation group went to Malawi in

November 1990 to meet Dhlakama in order to unlock the impasse that was preventing

the achievement of the cease-fire. In most cases, these actions were complemented by

well planned state diplomacy, which proved to be quite effective

Formulative mediators control the agenda and, accordingly, may alter it, set deadlines

and control the pace and formality of the meetings; they can change the number of

participants in the talks, bringing more players into the process so as to have more

interests represented at the negotiating table. But this was not the case. The booking

of meetings and the identification of the matters to be discussed were always made

with the consent of the parties.

The low-profile of the mediation conducted by the mediation group had little influence;

the group had no power to grant legitimacy to any diplomatic agreement; it had very

low capacity to support the implementation process that was being devised

. At times

and in some respects, the behaviour of the mediation group was close to formulative

strategy: the group advised the delegations on technical issues, helping them identify,

select and expand possible options

However, when the flexibility of the parties disappeared and the mediation group lost

control of the agenda

, it had to use the help of external actors who had greater

persuasion powers on the parties, that is, resort to the assistance of one-track

diplomacy, especially from the U.S. and Italian governments. The same happened when

they had to discuss technical matters, namely of a military nature, which members of

the mediation group had no knowledge of.

Idem: xii.

The example advanced by HUME on p. 63 illustrates this complementarity and coordination perfectly.

Idem: 95.

Ibidem: 73.

Ibidem: 62.

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The States

The action of the mediation group was closely monitored and supplemented, at all

times, by the diplomacy of various states, especially when it came to resolving issues of

great complexity or when the parties were more reluctant to reach an agreement.

African and Western governments were needed at various stages of the talks, in order

to: overcome the impasse between the heads of the delegations based in Rome; talk to

the top leaders; create legitimacy and set deadlines; and force the convergence of

opinion on issues that otherwise would still be unresolved

. According to Chester

Crocker, the discreet conduct of official diplomacy was instrumental in the formulation

of the sequence of issues to be addressed and in defining the way forward in the field

of military and constitutional arrangements

The Italian diplomacy was at the forefront of these initiatives, as it tirelessly promoted

and organized many meetings among the leaders of the factions and ensured the

presidency of the Joint Verification Commission (JVC) through its ambassador in

Maputo

. Italy was also deeply involved in various good offices’ initiatives and in

shuttle diplomacy, through its ambassador in Maputo, who met several times with

Dhlakama and Chissano

. In addition, the Italian Government borne much of the

expenses, including travel and accommodation of the delegations, and the political

coverage of the mediation. In early 1992, the Italian Parliament authorized the

government to use up to 1% of its foreign aid budget in favour of the peace process. In

addition to its representative in the mediation group, there was direct and effective

involvement of the Italian government and diplomacy in the mediation process.

The United States also played a crucial role right from the start of the talks, providing

technical advice, encouragement and public support for the peace process. They

formed a team of personnel from the State Department to constantly monitor the

progress of the talks, and it provided decisive support to the mediation group,

particularly to the RENAMO delegation, in technical areas that required the assistance

of experts. To help overcome some negotiating difficulties, members of this team,

acting in tandem with the mediation group, met separately with delegations to convince

them to adopt more flexible positions.

The U.S. involvement was not limited to the team that followed the talks. In moments

of impasse, the United States intervened at a "high" level, "advising" the parties,

particularly RENAMO, to moderate their positions. The U.S. presence in the negotiations

was critical because of the "persuasiveness" they possessed on the litigants, RENAMO

in particular. The Italian and American governments, especially the latter, followed a

formulative strategy which, in some cases, showed signs of typical manipulation

strategy.

From October 1991, the U.S. support to the mediation process became more active,

significantly increasing the involvement of its diplomacy in the talks. Both the Secretary

Ibidem: xi.

Ibidem.

Apparently, the only one who ignored the instrumental role of Italian diplomacy in support of the talks

was the actual Italian Foreign Minister, when, in February 1992, he suggested that Italy also joined the

talks as an official observer. HUME, op. cit., p.90.

Idem: 127.

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of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, as his assistant, Jeffrey Davidow, started to

meet more often, not only with the leaders of the factions, in parallel diplomacy to that

of the mediation group, to "help" them give more rapid and certain steps towards

peace, but also with African leaders whose contribution to the peace process could be

important. The involvement of U.S. diplomacy was also essential to ensure the

presence of the UN in implementing the security agreement, and guarantee the

connection with the Security Council.

The collaboration of several neighbouring states with the mediation group was also

important. Supplementing its action, they put pressure on Chissano and Dhlakama not

to leave the dialogue and to make concrete decisions. Various African statesmen helped

the mediation group in the final phase of the talks. Mugabe was perhaps the most

important African leader in this task. In September 1992, the mediation group urged

Mugabe to help overcome an impasse over negotiations. The delegations in Rome were

not able to reach an agreement on the size of the Armed Forces, the reform of police

and security services, and how to organize the civil administration in areas controlled

by RENAMO. Mugabe arranged a meeting between Dhlakama and Chissano in

Botswana, where they agreed to set up a committee to oversee the security services.

When military matters and how to implement them started to be discussed, the Italian

Government took an even more prominent role, providing the mediation group with

experts to guide and direct the discussion. This forced the introduction of changes in

the structure of the talks, namely increasing the size of delegations to include teams of

military experts, including those provided by the observer countries (France, Portugal,

UK and USA)

The convenience of involving a hard nucleus of countries that could offer the mediation

group and delegations not only technical advice on these issues, but also potentially

contribute with military forces to implement the peace agreement, apart from the

participation of the UN itself, became evident. With the exception of Italy and the U.S.,

the behaviour of the remaining state actors was characterized by facilitating contacts,

exploring the persuasiveness capacity of certain African leaders on their Mozambican

partners.

The United Nations and Other Non-State Actors

The UN and Tiny Rowland also collaborated in the peace process, but in a very different

way. In the list of players who participated in the peace process we must inevitably

include the UN, not forgetting, among other particularly important things that it led, the

coordination with key governments in the region and the organization of a donor’s

conference in Maputo. To implement the agreements it was necessary to mobilize the

contribution of other actors to a resource pool. Once the peace agreement was signed,

it was necessary to implement it, and this was where the role of the UN was crucial.

The procedures of this implementation had to be negotiated with the UN itself. Unlike

the mediation group, the UN Secretary-General could now deal with the parties from a

strong institutional position, which included permanent detailed rules for the

peacekeeping, the management of humanitarian aid programmes, a network of state

It was in this context that in June 1992, at the 10th round of negotiations, the invitation to France,

Portugal, United Kingdom, U.S., and the UN to join the talks with observer status was approved.

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donors of money and manpower, and the requirement of approval of the SC

. As noted

earlier, Tiny Rowland played an important role in providing air transportation to the

delegations and Mozambican leaders when and where necessary.

Conclusions

The analysis of the Mozambican peace process led us to four main conclusions. First,

the case study does not empirically demonstrate the thesis that informal intermediaries

and NGOs in particular are the most appropriate type of mediator to conduct the

mediation of violent intra-state conflicts. The mediation of the Mozambican peace

process cannot be considered an action of the T1, 5D type, let alone one of the T2D

type

. As such, supporting that view has no empirical validity. Reducing the

Mozambican peace talks to the role played by the Community of Sant'Egidio is factually

incorrect, because it was never a true mediator

Secondly, the peace mediation was a multi-track process in which the states played a

decisive role. We found it to be equally inaccurate to attribute the merit of the peace

initiative to the Community of Sant'Egidio and the Vatican, to the detriment of the role

played by states, where the Italian and American figured prominently. The collective

mediation arrangement adopted, which included representatives of a State, of an NGO

and a Church was, undoubtedly, sui generis. But due to the limited resources at their

disposal, the ability of the mediation group to influence and persuade the factions’

litigants was very limited. Whenever there was an impasse whose resolution appeared

to be more difficult, the mediation group had to ask for the diplomatic assistance of

influential states endowed with the resources they lacked (mainly Italy, the U.S. and

Zimbabwe). In practice, what prevailed was the diplomacy of states.

Third, in light of the Mozambican peace process, we found that NGOs and TD2

processes may, in general, complement the action of traditional agents (states and

international organizations), but are still far from being able to replace them or even

take action on an equal footing. Due to the fact that NGOs lack the legitimacy, capacity

or the stability of sovereign states, the latter still continue to play an indispensable and

irreplaceable role, which attests the vital importance of formal mediation in the

management of violent conflicts.

Fourth, Mozambique’s case has shown the reconciliation potential of the designated

sources of social power, including ideological ones, in this case expressed through

religion and religious elites (Mann, 1986). This is a topic whose application to conflict

resolution has been insufficiently studied and that goes beyond the scope of this work.

The Anglican and Catholic elites contributed greatly for the success of the peace talks,

as they acted in a concerted way with the leaders of FRELIMO and RENAMO, their

religious supporters. Not only was most of the leadership of RENAMO Catholic, as

mentioned above, but the leadership of FRELIMO had many Anglican Church followers.

If Chissano and Dhlakama had been Muslims, the influence of Christian religious elites

Ibidem: 139.

Crocker stressed that negotiations of the Mozambican case were in no way a pure example of T2D.

Ibidem, p. xi.

As mentioned in the text, the Community of Sant’Egidio only contributed with two members to the

mediation group, which included one representative of the Mozambican Church and another from the

Italian Government.

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on them would have been completely different. In an attempt to act on the success of

the Mozambique case - poorly understood and poorly studied - the Community of

Sant'Egidio later tried to get involved in mediating the conflict in Kosovo, without any

result. It missed a correct interpretation of events in Mozambique.

We think that the conclusions we have reached after examining the case of

Mozambique can be generalized. Unlike championed by many schools of thought, this

case empirically confirms our argument and the critical importance of T1D in the

management of violent conflicts. In these cases, T2D may support the efforts of

diplomacy, but will always play a secondary role and support. T2D and, therefore, the

involvement of NGOs, may be particularly important in other life stages of a conflict, for

example, during peacebuilding, in supporting reconciliation between estranged groups.

One cannot underestimate in any way the role played by these organizations, for

example, in humanitarian action or in support given to the reconstruction of war-torn

societies, but not in violent conflict mediation. The direct involvement of NGOs in the

mediation of violent conflict has not been common, but the few cases they were

involved in cannot be considered successes. The number of NGO interventions in this

area speaks for itself

The T1, T2D and 5D concepts are very appealing, but whose usefulness is questionable

when applied to the management of violent conflicts. The same can be said with regard

to civil society’s involvement in mediation of violent conflicts. This is an equally

appealing idea that collapses when one considers that violent conflicts tend to occur in

pre-modern societies, without an active civil society, or in more developed societies but

in which civil society organizations have been destroyed by violence, reducing its

potential ability to influence and persuade due to their tiny size.

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