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ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 2, n.º 2 (Autumn 2011), pp. 59-76

EUROPE – THE GEOPOLITICS OF DISUNION

José Manuel Freire Nogueira

email: nogueira.jmf@gmail.com

Retired Major-General of the Army.

Ph.D in International Relations from Universidade Nova de Lisboa (UNL).

President of the International Relations Committee of the Geographical Society of Lisbon

Abstract

There are forces which, by acting over a long time frame and by remaining almost

unaltered, leave traces in societies and nations that make them more or less prone to

certain behaviours. These marks include physical geography, which is like the stage of

history and exerts a profound influence on it. Europeans today face challenges that result

from their own perceptions and different cultural habits forged by centuries or even

thousands of years of conflicts brought about by religion, tribal views or linguistic barriers,

reinforced by the compartmentalized division of the territory, by the existence, or lack of it,

of large waterways, and by the mildness or rigour of the climate.

In fact, the union of Europe, which was often attempted by force, found a new impetus with

the end of World War 2, leading to a peaceful construct unprecedented in history. However,

as this union expanded and deepened, the aggregating cement that held Europe together

has degraded, appearing not to withstand the winds of the crises well. We will only be able

to strengthen what unites us when we gain awareness of what divides us.

Portugal, a country which is almost one thousand years old and which has validated itself

outside Europe from an early age, is facing yet another crisis for survival. Understanding the

possible ways-out beyond the “mist of the days” and the politically correct has now become

an exercise of citizenship.

Keywords

Deep forces; geography and politics; the various “Europes”; wealth and poverty of nations

How to cite this article

Nogueira, José Manuel Freire (2011). "

Europe - The geopolitics of disunion",

JANUS.NET

e-journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, N.º 2, Autumn 2011. Accessed [online] on date

of last view, observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol2_n2_art3

Article received on May 2011 and accepted for publication on October 2011

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ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 2, n.º 2 (Autumn 2011), pp. 59-76

Europe -the geopoitics of disunion

José Manuel Freire Nogueira

60

EUROPE – THE GEOPOLITICS OF DISUNION

José Manuel Freire Nogueira

To many off guard observers, including senior politicians, it seemed that the EU

enlargement to the East made possible by the implosion of the Soviet bloc represented

the reunion of Geopolitics with the History of Europe. Almost 20 years later, what we

see is a multifaceted reality, largely selfish and nationalistic, anchored in ancient roots

which, by contrast, seem to be anxious to demonstrate, again, that in the European

continent, the encounter of Geopolitics with History does not usually have a happy

ending.

In fact, nowadays the future of the European Union seems much darker than it was

then. One only needs to read the papers or hear the news to understand that the

financial crisis has prompted a resurgence of old selfishness and that the faith of many

Europeans in the future of the Union has been shaken,

1

even more so after the “cold

shower” that, not so long ago, the rejection by the French and Dutch of an important

step towards European integration represented. Nowadays, we also have important

fringes of population from some nations in the North and the South questioning the

benefits of remaining part of a union that brings, to some, such high costs, and, to

others, hard sacrifices. However, there is little to be surprised about.

Indeed, societies are a complex product. If, on the one hand, the causal links are

difficult to establish, on the other the wide margin of uncertainty that characterizes all

human action can lead in different directions. It seems indisputable that there is a set

of circumstances which, acting in the long term, shape them with particular features

that without determining their course, make them more or less prone to particular

behaviours. They are the deep forces, according to the extremely appropriate definition

of Pierre Renouvin.

2

Besides those, but not all, considered by Renouvin,

3

other forces

he did not taken into account are included here, as the author of this paper believes

them to be essential in the framework of this analysis

4

:

They are: History (with its myths, its solidarities, its self-image and its hostilities),

“Temperament” (cultural habits, the level of rigidity of society, the attitude to power

and adversity), Language (a true oral genome which, like some people argue, helps to

structure thinking), Religion (with its codes of conduct, favouring certain behaviours

and values, while disfavouring others), infra-national social forms, such as the Clan,

1

Among others, there are the many comments made by Ambassador Cutileiro in Expresso, particularly in

the 14 May 2011 edition, where a vast number of writers gives rein to their pessimism; there is also the

declarations made by former Chancellor Kohl when he received the Henry Kissinger prize from the

American Academy in Berlin (May 2011), or what José Ignacio Torreblanca, Director of the Madrid Office

of the European Council on Foreign Relations wrote in May (in 25-05-11).

2

Pierre Renouvin (1991). «Les Forces Profondes» in Introduction à L’Histoire des Relations Internationale,

Paris: Armand Colin, 4th Ed.

3

Renouvin considered as Deep Forces the geographical factors, demographic conditions, economic and

financial forces, the national sentiment, nationalisms, and the pacifist sentiment.

4

Nogueira, José Manuel Freire (2011). O Método Geopolítico Alargado – Persistências e Contingências em

Portugal e no Mundo, Lisbon: IESM.

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José Manuel Freire Nogueira

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The Tribe and Ethnicity (where societies, even those supposedly more advanced,

regress to at times of crisis), to which it seems advantageous to add, besides the

relevant data on Human Geography and the key aspects of the situation, the almost

unchanged scenario where the lives of societies unfold, that is, Physical Geography, the

basis of the geopolitical analysis method.

5

Europe constitutes an excellent case study.

Having been inhabited for thousands of years by relatively stable peoples whose

history is quite well known, it is obvious that its political geography lies in factors that

make it different from other regions in the world but which also translate into profound

internal differences. .

In effect, the History of Europe is quite turbulent as it is made of regionalisms that

consistently resist the imperial dreams which, with some regularity, reappear on its

stage. With the exception of the Roman Empire (which just dominated the

Mediterranean basin and the temperate parts of Western Europe) or that of the

Habsburgs, who exercised a relatively weak power over Central Europe, none of them

stayed beyond the ephemeral.

Charlemagne, Charles V, France in the 17th and 18th centuries, Napoleon, Hitler, all of

them leaders of continental empires, stumbled at the thirst for national or even

regional autonomy that seems to characterize Europeans and that even finds an

explanation, among many others, in the thesis of the French Castex on the

“Continental disturber l”,

6

which foresaw the defeat of the continental hegemonic

impulses.

Indeed, it was not in vain that feudalism could persist in Europe for almost one

thousand years, or that Germany was divided into more than three hundred political

units until its unification in the nineteenth century, and that Italy has only united and

consolidated itself as a country in recent times, or that, even now, Europe is the

continent with the second largest number of states, despite its small size. It is not in

vain also that the modern nation-state was invented by the Europeans, and that this

invention was subsequently exported to the rest of the world, as disunity and

cantonalism seem to be the historical matrix of the Europeans, with war being one of

their most enduring institutions. National (and even regional) hatreds and self-interest

resurface when they seemed appeased. This deep force is one that is dangerous to

ignore.

This is because Europeans are profoundly different from each other. Their cultural

matrix was formed over a long process that emphasized their differences. In the

South, the mercy of nature enabled the early flowering of a civilization. In a clear

demonstration of the theory of “challenge and response” advanced by Toynbee,

7

Southern Europeans did not have to face wild beasts or the hardships of nature, for

which reason the pressure to act as a group was much less than that exerted on

5

This has little, if anything, to do with the common meaning of the word Geopolitics, a term that was

misappropriated by Henry Kissinger in the seventies – and which he never defined – and which has

become a sort of synonymous with he use of power in international relations, creating a terminological

confusion that only promotes ignorance. For this, the word strategy, or even its extreme, geostrategy,

already existed and still does.

6

Castex, Raoul (1935). Théories Stratégiques, V, Paris.

7

Toynbee, Arnold (1934.1961). A Study of History, 12 volumes, Oxford University Press.

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José Manuel Freire Nogueira

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Europeans from the North, where individual survival depended on the strength of the

group. Even today, selfish individualism and disorganization are trademarks of the

south, whereas discipline and organization dominates in the north.

Portuguese professor Políbio de Almeida (1932-2008), when trying to define the

behaviour of the three European major ethnic groups (Slavic, Germanic and Latin),

pointed out that the amorphousness typical of the individual German ends when he

becomes part of a group. Accordingly, whereas association is the source of fulfilment,

for Latin people it becomes the opposite, a cause for suspicion. The individualism of the

latter is confused with pride, vanity and a desire to stand out even at the expense of

the group he may belong to. Pointing to the geography of southern Europe as a

structuring force, Políbio de Almeida went as far as to affirm that the sociability of the

Latin people is limited to small groups and is averse to centralized planning.

8

The work of Dutch social psychologist Hofstede

9

shows similar characteristics, albeit

from a different perspective. The “power distance” (which in his view meant the degree

of rigidity of society in which the influence of status at birth determines social position,

among other things), was, in his opinion, most prevalent in societies where the Roman

tradition prevailed, and lower in those where German egalitarianism was deeply

rooted.

Events in England seem to be a clear demonstrator of the arguments advanced by the

social psychologist. In that part of Europe, the legions called by Emperor Honorius in

402 to defend Rome eventually never returned. The withdrawal, at first believed to be

temporary, became a definitive one, leaving the Britons powerless against the

incursions of the Saxons and the Angles, who, after the fall of Rome, transformed their

raids into migration. The society of the Britons disappeared in a short time, because

unlike other parts of the former empire, in Britain there was no assimilation between

the Roman-Britons and the new Germanic lords.

The traces of the German order were banished and replaced by a more primitive, yet

more egalitarian German society. Hofstede stresses that among the Germans, the

power of the chief was subordinate to the assembly of free men. In his view, this was

an historical indicator of reduced power distance. Much later, in 1215, King John, in

conflict with his barons, granted the Magna Carta. As pointed out by Hofstede, this

document, considered to be the founder of English liberties, represents the victory of

the rights of free men following the old tradition of the Germanic peoples.

10

The small

power distance thus plunged deeply into the history of England.

The high need “to control uncertainty” (the need to predict and codify everything)

common to all Latin peoples and much less present in peoples from the North also

derives from the Roman tradition. Hofstede also highlights two other factors: the

existence of strong “individualism” in the North (up-frontness in relationships and

acceptance that there are winners and losers) as well as high “masculinity” (with the

glorification of competition and success, and the severe punishment of offenders),

which opposes the “femininity” (which avoids confrontation and humiliation) that is

characteristic of societies in the South.

8

Almeida, Políbio de (1994). “A casa comum europeia” in Ensaios de Geopolítica, Lisboa: ISCSP: 211-216.

9

Hofstede, Geert (1980). Culture´s consequences: international differences in work-related values.

London: Sage Publications.

10

Hofstede, op. cit: 100.

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Language is another distinctive feature. Although derived from the major Indo-

European group, European languages have come to differ to a greater or lesser extent

(as part of a process made deeper by the large migrations of the first millennium) in

such a way that each language soon became intelligible even to its closest neighbours,

thus leading to the development of a “linguistic cantonalism”

11

that strengthened local

identities which, in some cases, joined together as nations at a later stage, often

through the imposition of a common language. Hence the growing need for a lingua

franca for communicating among different groups and which, generally speaking, was

only at the reach of the elites, with the own language being used for communicating

within their own group.

Such was the role of Latin, French and nowadays clearly that of English which, for the

first time, is within reach of a large mass of individuals. Tellingly, it is a European

language, but it is as if it was from extra European origin, since the reasons for

adopting it are related to the huge power of the United States, where the cultural

models, fashions, management criteria, and military power stem from. It must be

noted that the same language, when used by the British at a time when they had

power similar to that held by Americans today, never played a major international role

as an international communication vehicle outside the country.

Religion, in turn, having shaped identities, was also the reason for the largest

fractures.

The religious matrix of Europe is undoubtedly Judeo-Christian. After having penetrated

Roman society, Christianity only took three centuries to spread through the

Mediterranean world and in the areas on the edge of olive and vine producing lands.

Indeed, the Catholic rite is closely tied to bread (wheat), wine (grapes) and olive oil

(olive trees), which in fact means to a specific geographical area.

12

Its expansion to the

north even forced the expansion of vines into Belgium and England, in contradiction

with the requirements of their natural vegetations, to meet the needs of celebrating

mass. However, as noted by French geographer Albert Demangeon,

13

as transport

became cheaper, the cultivation of vineyards soon retreated to areas more suitable to

their needs in terms of vegetation and ripening: the sunny south.

Many years later, with the demise of the Middle Ages, Rome’s Pope-obeying

Christianity faced deep tensions that eventually ended in rupture that approximately

followed the ancient northern borders of the Roman Empire, which was a very old and

strong line of cultural divide. To the north of this line, in general, the Reformation

implemented Protestantism and a distinct way of seeing the world, without obedience

to the Roman papacy. This was where a type of society, with much more simple and

austere rites unconnected to Mediterranean geography, in a colder and more rigid

Europe – how not to think about geography – developed and ended up playing a major

role in the world.

Max Weber, rightly or wrongly, even saw the reason for the birth of the capitalist spirit

in that separation. According to him, by sanctifying work and daily life instead of

11

Even today, local dialects spoken by small groups coexist with the official languages of the states. This is

the case, in Portugal, of the Mirandês, which is officially recognized.

12

Chauprade, Aymeric (2003). Géopolitique, constantes et changements dans l’histoire, Paris: Ellipses:

298.

13

Demangeon, Albert (1952). Problèmes de Geographie Humaine, Paris: Armand Colin.

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waiting for the reward after death, Protestantism, alongside the advancement of

science, contributed to the “decriminalization” of profit and to the sanctification of

work. He completes his opinion by saying that almost all big businessmen from

Germany in his days were Protestant, mainly Calvinists.

14

In Southeast Europe, a third division, also the result of ancient cultural boundaries

stemming from the Great Schism which, following intractable conflict between the

Emperor of the East and the Pope and which mirrored the clash between the Greco-

Byzantine and the Latin-German worlds, led to the division in 1054, to this day, of the

two churches, with the Orthodox Church becoming subordinate to the Patriarch of

Constantinople. When Constantinople fell under Turkish rule (1453), the head of

orthodoxy moved to Kiev and then to Moscow. Thus, we have at least three or four

“Europes”. The role of infra-national forms of organization, even the most basic, is not

smaller. The kinship-based clan is a structured basic human group which is both the

oldest and the first – when territorialized – to have a proto-geopolitical meaning. In

this case, it is inside the clan that the first social relationship between humans and

their territories takes place. In other words, it is within the clan that the embryo of

geopolitics is generated. Successively grouped into tribes and ethnic groups, clans still

exist in a few human societies, as is the case in some parts of Africa or that example

well-known in the Western world provided by the famous Scottish clans which, even

today, have a surprising degree of cohesion. As for the tribe, it is less cohesive than

the clan because it is the result of the junction of several clans. It carried the germ of

political cohesion and is rightly considered as such. Indeed, the first political

manifestations as we see them today – one people, one head, one territory – coincide

with tribal organizations. Tribes eventually became federated into nations. But this was

a very long process and the coincidence of national borders with the borders of the

states is a relatively recent phenomenon. Inheritance, historical or conquest rights

slowly overlapped the “right of peoples to self-determination”, and it was only in the

wake of the social and political changes triggered by the French Revolution that the so-

called “springtime of peoples” began. Hailed as the primary cause of war (well

expressed in several of the famous 14 points of President Wilson

15

), the mismatch

between the State and the Nation was severely restricted after the First World War,

when the political map of Europe (as elsewhere in the world) was redesigned at

international conferences. However, in the contemporary world, many states are not

formed by a single nation, let alone by a single ethnic group. It is true that outside

Europe, some states – true artificial constructs – are even directly formed by tribes

whose only connection is that of a conglomerate.

Indeed, when artificially grouped into states, many ethnic groups cannot resist the

social, demographic, political and religious tensions that occur, often independently of

human will. History, including contemporary history, is filled with inter-ethnic conflicts.

But the deep resistance of primitive forms of human organization is better

demonstrated in places where the state proves to be took weak to perform its basic

function - failed states - and where societies regress to their more primitive identities,

14

Weber, Max (2001). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Portuguese translation,

Barcarena: Presença (orig. from 1920).

15

Snell, John L. (1954). "Wilson on Germany and the Fourteen Points", in The Journal of Modern History,

Vol. 26, No. 4, The University of Chicago Press, Dec.: 364-369.

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be them the ethnic group, the tribe or even the clan. The shattering of the former

Yugoslavia and, more recently, the events in Libya, are a daunting example for all

those who believed in the inexorable march of progress.

Finally comes physical geography and, within it, first, the climatic factors. Historian

David Landes spoke at length on this subject.

16

According to him, Europe, particularly

its western part, enjoys privileged conditions: the winters are cold enough to prevent

the spread of diseases and gently enough to foster a good balance between inhabitants

and the environment. Rainfall is distributed throughout the year., creating fertility

conditions rarely found elsewhere. It was this same uniform and moderately abundant

supply of water, combined with low rates of evaporation, which freed the Europeans

from prevailing tyranny, namely the “river civilizations”, where the necessary irrigation

works generated central and authoritarian powers that Europe has not known.

These exceptional conditions favoured Europeans with good and relatively uniform

harvests, combined with large herds and dense forests. This almost unique

combination gave rise to sedentary civilizations that raised cattle and which have

proven to be bigger and stronger than the rest of the world, in addition to producing

natural fertilizer healthier than the one used in Asia, based on human faeces. The

powerful European horse was thus able to carry the heavy medieval knight, was

supreme in charges, and for many years unbeatable in conventional combat.

17

It was

also the strength of European animals that allowed more efficient heavy work and the

transport of goods, as well as, at a later stage and with enormous impact, the towing

of artillery to the battlefield.

As a result, European had access to a richer diet, growing increasingly stronger and

relatively free from the worms that plagued China and India. Accordingly, not only

animals but also human beings were stronger. The European domination, which later

spread throughout the world, was frequently due to the inequalities of nature.

However, this strength is also the result of other stimuli. Paul Kennedy, the renowned

author of “The Rise and Fall of Great Powers” points out that, in the beginning of the

sixteenth century, no one would believe that the small states of Western Europe would

impose themselves on the major centres of power that existed at the time: Ming China,

the Ottoman Empire, the Mongol Empire, Muscovy, and Japan. It was the absence of a

single central authority - which Kennedy sees as the happy result of the fall of the

Roman Empire and of the compartmentalized geographical features of Europe, where

there are no dominating large plains or huge water basins surrounded by fertile lands

capable of imposing uniformity of thought - that was responsible for the huge degree

of freedom and for the relatively few barriers to change that led to the spiral of

scientific and technical progress that led to the supremacy of the West.

18

With such tools, it is not surprising that during an extended period of time Europe

dominated the world. However, the strength of the Europeans turned against them and

16

Landes, David S. (2005). The Wealth and Poverty of Nations – Why are some so rich and others so poor ,

Portuguese version Lisbon: Gradiva, 7th Edition (original edition from 1998).

17

In particular they stopped the Muslim onslaught towards Central Europe – which used light Arabian

horses – at the Battle of Poitiers in 732. In 1187, the Muslims had their revenge when the knights of

Saladin, mounted on light horses, destroyed at Hattin a force of crusaders mounted on heavy armoured

horses that had carried their heavy riders throughout the day under scorching sun.

18

Kennedy, Paul (1987). The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random House, New York: 3-30.

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also encouraged their rivalries. Even a cursory look at history shows that the peoples

of Europe seem to have never aspired to large unions.

Having looked at the non-geographical and climatic (albeit strongly influenced by

physical geography) aspects that seem to lie at the root of this situation, it is time to

examine physical geography, whose continuity is everywhere in Europe, as elsewhere

in the world, where it continues to act as a deep force. It must be pointed out that

there are large islands near Europe whose critical mass is enough to generate island

nations, with their typical sense of exception and isolation. This applies particularly to

Great Britain, which was the seat of maritime power, embodying Europe’s superiority

while keeping itself on the flank of the continent.

There are also a number of large peninsulas in Europe, and it is known that they tend

to become autonomous from mainland

19

or even unite politically.

20

Indeed, all great

peninsulas in Europe have long been the home of one or more independent states, the

latter being justified by geographical barriers (such as in Scandinavia) or by cultural

ones (like the Iberian Peninsula). Opening up to the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, they

all have been home to maritime powers and have the typical mentality of these powers

which, about 2500 years ago, caught the attention of Greek historian Thucydides

21

, and

which differs greatly from the continental mindset that prevails in the centre of Europe.

In the same fashion, the topography of Europe is characterized by the abundance of

mountain ranges that either compartmentalize space (this is the case of the Pyrenees,

amongst many others) or are zones where mountain people have settled (like in

Switzerland). In any case, for thousands of years they have constituted physical

barriers hampering easy movement, also facilitating defence and thus impeding the

great empires. They also give origin to true “cultural cantons”, since the mountain

culture tends to differ from the one that usually dominates the plain. Among other

reasons, it was this topography that enabled small – sometimes minute – political units

to subsist to this day. These are marks that progress will eventually fade away, but

that cannot be ignored.

The river basins of Europe also have a role to play, as well demonstrated by German

geographers in the first half of the twentieth century. In the absence of a structuring

large river like the Nile, the Euphrates, or the Yellow River, Europe’s powers and wealth

concentrated over several large navigable rivers which allowed the movement of goods

at low prices. The Danube has Vienna, the Po has Milan, the Rhine has Amsterdam and

Frankfurt, and the Thames has London.

22

Again, geography separates the North and South of Europe which, with the exception of

the Po valley, has no major river that can be used for trade purposes. As a possible

consequence, the people of the South, when they developed their own business, they

did so from a distance and by sea, disadvantaged by nature, which did not give them

the possibility of linking their ports to the interior which otherwise could have

happened. Accordingly, northern Europe became more urban, industrialized and

technocratic, whereas the South tended to be more rural, agricultural and less

19

Ratzel, Friedrich (1987). La Géographie Politique, Fayard: 107.

20

Chauprade, Aymeric, op.cit: 126-153.

21

Thucydides (2010). History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Raul Rosado Fernandes and

Grabriela Granwher, Lisbon: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

22

Zeihan, Peter (2010). STATFOR, 21 December.

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developed in terms of industry. In a world that emphasizes the values of the north, the

formerly civilized and refined south has, for now, become a kind of periphery.

Therefore, there are several “Europes” and, within them, a wide range of states which,

having withstood the vicissitudes of history, jealously retain their prerogatives as

nation-states. There was no lack of ambition to impose unity by force. But even when

its military power was overwhelming, it all stumbled upon the defiance of those who

insisted on becoming independent.

The last two attempts of a military nature came from Germany, and its own power was

so strong that it took extra-European interventions to restore the previous order, or at

least something resembling it. Again, in the latest attempt, this time not military

oriented, Germany was the one of the key drivers. A little analytical retreat at this point

seems appropriate to better understand it.

The Germans, who suffered from large scale “European-type cantonalism” until 1870,

started to move towards their own unity with a customs union which, by encouraging

common geographical and cultural factors, soon produced the desired results. It was

perhaps too successful, inasmuch as, as soon as Germany became the main European

power (its population grew 65 percent between 1871 and 1914 and on the eve of World

War I, Germany produced twice as much steel as Great Britain …

23

) and soon denoted

hegemonic ambitions.

It was a dream that went wrong, and defeated Germany was forced to sign the

humiliating treaty of Versailles in 1919, which was a sore for the country’s national

pride. The purpose of war, set in September 1914 by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg,

was to form a customs union extending from France to Poland, keeping Great-Britain

and Russia apart from the European continent, which was theorized by Friedrich

Nauman (1860-1919) in 1915 in his book Mitteleuropa,

24

and failed completely.

When Germany was admitted to the League of Nations in 1926, its pacifist government,

which wrestled with profound internal problems and the demons of revanchism, soon

proposed (1929) the creation of the United States of Europe through Gustav

Stresemann

25

.

Nevertheless, in that same year, the crash of the New York Stock Exchange plunged

the world into a full-blown crisis and also silenced the voices of common sense,

releasing the demons of nationalism and racism. Ten years later, the world watched the

launch of the greatest catastrophe in history. It led not only to another defeat of

Germany (again, it took the entire world to overwhelm it) but also to the ruin of Europe

and to its decline on the world stage.

Even during the war, German lawyers built what they believed to be a new model of

relations among states. It encompassed some of the most permanent and negative

matrixes of German ideas. Written by jurist Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), who led the War

Institute for Politics and International Law, the project Treaty between Germany, Italy

23

Desfargues, Philipe Moureau (2003). Introdução à Geopolítica, Lisbon: Gradiva: 70-71.

24

It corresponds to Central Europe. Nevertheless, in addition to anticipating the direct political control of

almost the entire region, the concept advocated Germany’ economic control up to the Caucasus

(including also the Ukraine and the Balkans)and could extend to Bagdad.

25

Gustav Stresemann (1878-1929), Chancellor in 1923 and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany between

1923 and 1929. Nobel Prize winner in 1926 together with his French counterpart Aristide Briand, due to

his role in the Treaty of Locarno.

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and Japan on the configuration of Large Areas in Europe and Greater East Asia, drew a

world that was remarkably different from the one that came to be established by the

Declaration of St. Francisco and the principles of Bretton Woods.

26

The Large Areas were to be articulated in Communities of States under the guidance of

a Directing State that reserved the right to impose, within its limitations, its own

political conditions. Thus, a less unitary entity than the state, albeit a more cohesive

one, would emerge.

27

Under the Directing State of Each Community of States there

would be independent states with limited sovereignty. In theory, the adhesion of these

States – to which every state geographically located inside the Large Area – would be

done on a volunteer basis and conducted by a bilateral treaty between the Directing

State and each of the acceding states (article 3). Relations with non-members would be

governed by International Law.

In an interesting preview, the Treaty referred to the existence and recognition of

International Law, the Domestic Law of States and created a new figure within each

Community of States: Community Law. It is clear that the use of this figure by the

enemies of the idea of European Community conceals, in fact, the huge difference

between the two concepts: the accession to the EEC or to the EU resulted from a

volitional act, not from imposition by force, as rightly stressed by Mario Losano.

28

Despite all the fears that a possible resurgence of Germany caused among its former

political adversaries, or maybe because of it, when the new German political autonomy

emerged– the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) – the founders of the Benelux

countries, together with France, the FRG and Italy, decided in 1952 to put together the

industrial means that traditionally supported military apparatus, creating the European

Coal and Steal Community (ECSC), and thus the first European community.

In the same year, the same countries tried to go further and integrate their own

military apparatuses and this led to the signing of the Treaty of Paris, creating the

second European community – The European Defence Community (EDC) – which never

came into being as it was rejected by the French Parliament.

This event strengthened the importance of NATO and, once the North American “shield”

was secured, Europe was able to engage in economic development.

In 1958 and through the Treaty of Rome, the six ECSC countries signed the European

Economic Community treaty (EEC) which would lead to the creation of a common

economic area. In the same year, another means of making war – the atom – was held

in common by the EURATOM treaty, and this meant the existence of three European

communities. Since then, the ECC continued to widen and deepen.

This was an unparalleled historical construction whose achievements are undeniable

and unprecedented in the European continent, and whose assumptions remained

unaltered until the political earthquake of 1989. There had never been such prosperity

and cooperation among Europeans for so long. It seemed that the inter-state conflict

had definitely been put away, the same applying to war.

26

It must be pointed out that the difference is formal rather than real. The political-strategic blocks of the

Cold War had their Leader State, and many of the weaker members had, indeed, limited sovereignty.

27

Losano, Mario G. (2006). “Il Mondo secondo Hitler”, in Limes. Rivista italiana di geopolitica, n. 5: 238.

28

Losano, Mario, op. cit: 248.

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But in 1989 the world changed. As usual, at the time people only spoke about the

“dividends of peace” and of radiant tomorrows. The spectacular move back of the

Soviet Union covered the profound change that occurred in Europe. In fact, and despite

arising old fears in France, the United Kingdom and Russia, the same fears that in 1907

had led to the “Triple Entente”, to the cooperation between France and Russia in the

1930s and the occupation of Germany after 1945 (Mitterrand even nurtured the dream

of cooperating with Gorbachev to prevent the reunification of Germany, under the

complacent eyes of Mrs. Thatcher

29

), Germany was reunited in the wake of the fall of

the Berlin Wall.

In a profoundly altered international context, the European project that had started as

a great “Zollverein” (name of the customs union created in 1834 in Germany under the

aegis of Prussia and which ultimately facilitated the creation of the Second Reich),

albeit with the purpose of “pacifying” Germany and make war unthinkable, was actually

transformed into the European Union in Maastricht in 1992.

Europe’s impotence before the Yugoslavian crisis – the cacophony had began right after

the unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the new reunited Germany –

pushed the proponents of the European idea and of the old continent as a global player

to new leaps forward. The theoretical advances made in Amsterdam, Helsinki, Nice and

finally, in Lisbon, allowed the creation of a facade of a political leadership, a caricature

of common foreign policy, as well as a kind of military structure aimed at lesser tasks –

the Petersberg tasks.

Compared with the major success of the EEC, the Union’s integration ambitions have

not produced brilliant results. By incorporating a broader range of countries – with

often quite diverse traditions, cultures, interests, loyalties and hostilities - and by trying

to extend its action beyond economic cooperation, the EU, and forgive the simplification

made here for analytical purposes, faces two basic dilemmas: either it undertakes the

policy agreed by its most powerful members or, due to the wide divergence of a few

national and regional interests, it limits itself, as a rule, to govern by consensus, that

is, by the lowest common denominator.

30

Also the method adopted so far in European integration – a “top down” decision that

excludes the supposedly unenlightened masses – seems to have reached its limits, as

those masses increasingly demand to be heard. However, when consulted, they

frequently invalidate the development of European integration, often, it must be

stressed, to “punish” their national governments. This does not help matters, rather

favouring the re-nationalization of policies and the rebirth of national selfishness. Only

the great unifying events appear to be able to revive the faith of the Europeans, but the

reality and creativity of the people insist on failing to come up with them.

Rather, the recent financial crisis exposed a number of structural weaknesses and

brought to the surface the various “Europes” that underlie the theoretical constructs.

Oversimplifying for purposes of analysis ( the reality is too complex and multifaceted to

be addressed in an article of this size), basically we are in the presence of a cold,

protestant and economically flourishing Northern Europe that, having taken enormous

29

Kissinger, Henry (1996). Diplomacia, Lisboa: Gradiva: 100-102.

30

The analogy with the Confederation Helvetica, which cautiously maintains its neutrality, balancing the

centrifugal forces that inevitably result from an alignment that unpleased one of its language minorities,

has come to the mind of many people.

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advantages of the single currency, has been refusing solidarity to what it perceives as

the chaotic southern countries, which, with the blindness that characterizes those who

do not value forecasting and planning

31

, lived in the illusion they were Northern without

being so and relinquished their most basic means of production, adopting lifestyles that

were not theirs, while squandering a wealth they did not possess.

A third “Europe”, even more continental and ingrown, always fearful of Russia (due to

the weight of history and the geographical position) lies to the East and tends to yield

to German interests, while viewing with concern the growing links between Germany

and Russia that raise old historical ghosts, seeming to believe a lot more in the

eventual North American protection than in European solidarity and its incipient defence

mechanisms.

32

These fears are not confined to Eastern Europe. Indeed, what is happening on a global

level seems to justify these worries. On that aspect, difficulties also seem to favour old

selfishness and the return of power politics that are their inevitable consequence. In

1904, Halford Mackinder theorized in a classic text of geopolitical thinking

33

that an

alliance between Germany and Russia would create such a combination of power that

the maritime powers would find themselves excluded from Eurasia. The United

Kingdom and the U.S. fought against this nightmare in World War I, and it is legitimate

to assume that it was to stop it from occurring again that the United States intervened

in Europe from 1942. NATO, which was geopolitically justified by Mackinder in 1943,

34

served the same purpose again. Currently, in the face of a Russian geopolitical school

that aims to rebuild the empire and the rebirth of the “pan-isms”,

35

the European have

obvious reasons to worry again, especially when the U.S. seems unconcerned with

European affairs. How long for?

In this scenario, Europe gets distracted with financial matters and lacks the energy and

vision to look after its much battered union. Enlargement is no longer part of the

rhetoric and there is the suspected perception that it would bring more problems than

benefits, as it could import into the Union fractures and rivalries that could make

current problems even more difficult to solve. Accordingly, the old divisions become,

again, very clear and rooted, at least in part, in the cultural and geographical factors

explained earlier. Even if these are mere perceptions and not concrete realities, the

difference is not that big. Is there hope for Europe or will the old ghosts return?

What is happening in Hungary (let us also recall the split of Czechoslovakia), in Finland,

Denmark (which unilaterally revoked the Schengen Agreement) and, in a distinct way,

in Belgium, gives great cause for caution. Ethnicity and History are being brought back

with a vengeance not only by nationalist parties, even in Germany, where the failure of

multiculturalism has been proclaimed and German citizenship laws that recall the

darkest periods in recent history have been enacted. We must not forget that in 1944,

when not even the propaganda could hide the disastrous course of war for Germany, an

31

According to Hall’s criteria with regard to the organization of time, societies are divided into

“monochronic “(where the organization of time is sequential and activities take place according to an

organized chronological flow) and “polychronic” (where there is the tendency to carry out several

activities simultaneously without prior ordering the sequence). Hall, Edward (1993), Understanding

Cultural Differences - Germans, French and Americans, Yarmouth: Maine.

32

Friedman, George (2011). Visegrad: A new European Military Force, STRATFOR, 17 Maio.

33

Mackinder, Halford J. (1904). “The Geographical Pivot of History” in Geographical Journal 23.

34

Mackinder, Halford J. (1943). “The Round World and the winning of peace” in Foreign Affairs nº 2.

35

Dugin, Alexandr (2010). The Great War of the Continents, Antagonista (original from 2005).

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article entitled “The end of Europe?” published in the magazine of the German Ministry

of Foreign Affairs Berlin Rom Tokio stressed that whatever the organization of Europe

after the conflict, Germany would remain a Directing State or Guiding State, at the risk

of the breakup of Europe.

36

Is this what we are seeing?

Both Helmuths (Kohl and Schmidt), who ruled Germany for 24 years, feared that

future. Convinced that the leaders after them (and not only in Germany) would forget

the war and return to the nationalism of the nineteenth century, they recommended

the acceleration of the European integration as a panacea against further disaster.

Schmidt went even further: in his view, Germany should never have nuclear weapons,

nor belong to the UN Security Council, as the country had shown only too well what it

was capable of when given a free rein”.

37

It was not even necessary to wait long. Selfishness did not take time to surface. As

early as in 1991, during the first Iraq War, Kohl himself refused to consider a missile

attack on Turkey as an attack on NATO,

38

refusing the solidarity that turns strength

into an alliance. Shortly afterwards, as mentioned earlier, Germany, without any

consultation with its partners, unilaterally recognized the independence of Croatia and

Slovenia and adopted a policy that favoured its own economic interests, a situation

that was particularly clear in the Balkans. However, candour has its limits, and in May

2010, President Kholer was forced to resign after declaring, in Afghanistan, that the

intervention of German armed forces had the purpose of protecting German economic

interests.

39

Indeed, it is very difficult to counter the deep forces that may only be evaded with

patience and perseverance. This lesson has been frustratingly difficult to learn by those

who, by ignoring them, act like children on the beach and build sand castles convinced

that they will withstand the force of the tide.

In a continent that invented the nation-state and continues to be carved up into

multiple sovereignties,

40

where the selfishness of citizens is expressed democratically

and has the force of law, top volunteer unions have a difficult time surviving, although,

of course, nothing is impossible. The process of European Integration – whatever form

it will end up having - in addition to a mobilizing ideal that goes beyond mere economic

issues (a new negative association formed due to the fear of others is obviously never

excluded), needs time and can only be attained throughout several generations. It also

requires that the basic purposes of the state – ensuring Security and Welfare – may be

undertaken in a climate of tranquillity, peaceful coexistence and domestic prosperity.

Clearly, the future of Europe, in purely theoretical terms, has several solutions.

Without wishing to make a comprehensive analysis of all possible variants, I shall focus

on just three possibilities: the first, which was unthinkable only a few years ago, is the

36

Losano, Mario, “Il Mondo secondo Hitler”, cit: 243-247.

37

Cutileiro, José (2010). “O Mundo dos Outros – Natal em Março” in Expresso, 23 Dezembro.

38

Huntington, Samuel P. (1999). The Clash of Civilizations, Portuguese version Gradiva: Lisbon: 162.

39

New York Times-Europe, 31 May, 2010

40

The level of cohesion, which is the highest inside the clan, decreases as the social basis expands, and

reaches its lowest level among nations, a level where usually the most efficient aggregating cement is

the existence of a common enemy.

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end of the Union. Whether it takes the form of a return to the nationalist policies of the

nineteenth century, or whether it ends up limiting the Union to a club of the richest

countries, the tendency for the come back, this time quite openly, of the Directing

States

41

will be inevitable. No doubt that the “natural” geopolitical groupings would be

favoured by this solution. The question is the fate of the weakest links: reduced to a

condition of states with limited sovereignty in the worst style of the vision of Carl

Schimtt, they could attempt to get together in natural geopolitical groups, although

such a future is unlikely due to the large differences that continue to exist among

them. Poverty is a bad counsellor.... Still within the previous scenario, there is also

the possibility of seeking external solidarity, something which is believed to be more

realistic in the case of states with historical ties outside Europe. The United Kingdom

(which is not part of the single currency) is a clear example of that possibility, thanks

to its special connection to the U.S. and its traditional policy of separation from

continental politics, whose hegemonies it has almost always fought against. A sharp

European decline may lead some states of the current Union to tread the paths of the

past again.

Another possibility is, of course, the deepening of the Union according to the federal

model, surpassing the inter-governmental model that has shown a strong tendency

towards the Directing State of group of Directing Sates, as aimed by the “founding

fathers”. This solution might allow going beyond the Post-Modern Sate

42

which, after

all, in practice perpetuated the notion that, whereas all states are equal, some are

more equal than others. This solution might also provide an answer to the poor

solidarity that the various “Europes” have shown to each other and would require at

least an economic governance of the Union.

However, there is another alternative, which is strongly provocative but equally

promising: I insisted earlier on the strength of infra-national forms of social

organization. Not without reason, as they underlie all societies and are present in

states that are too big to deal with small things and too small to address large issues,

which means that local issues tend to gain strength, albeit in a different form.

43

Maybe

because of precisely that, it is necessary to go beyond the nation-state, even the post-

modern state, and go back to some form of tribe and localness (in history, recurrences

never take the same form), which, in a confusing and tentative way, are emerging

without a geopolitical rationale that confers them consistency, at least for now. If, to

this, we add the undeniable internal change that European policies caused within the

states, the habits of free-movement, the clear dispute among transnational groups for

the monopoly of power of states, whether they are financial groups, social or opinion

movements, then we may have the fertile melting pot that encourages change.

Could the continent that invented the nation-state also declare its death? Is

cooperation possible by consensus of values and culture, as a recent work intended,

41

Remember the words of President Cavaco Silva in October 2011 in his speech at the University Institute

of Florence.

42

Concept defended by Robert Cooper, among others, in The Post-Modern State and the World Order,

Demos, 2000).

43

Topic addressed by various authors: Among other, see the excellent paper by Ana Margarida Roldão, “Da

Europa das Nações à Europa das Regiões” in Informação Internacional, Análise Económica e Política,

coord. by José Félix Ribeiro, Ministry of Planning, Forecasting and Planning Department, vol I, 2001: 307-

335, or Aymeric Chauprade, Géopolitique… cit: 810- 833.

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albeit with huge gaps, to have been the model that prevailed in ancient Greece?

44

Is

peace attainable by simple consensus, by “complex interdependence” (I took the

liberty to refer to the ideas of Nye and Keohane

45

) without a strong hegemony project?

Or is it that the so-called thinkers of the “realist” school are right and the deep forces

condition human nature to such an extent that we are doomed to repeating ourselves?

It is important to reflect, albeit briefly, on the role of Portugal in this stage of

intertwined interests. Portugal is one of the oldest countries in Europe and indeed, the

one with the oldest borders. Never having suffered from secessionist attempts – even

when it had more than one political power, they fought for the same central power

46

–

it may well be said that it enjoys from an enviable degree of national cohesion, a

quality all the more remarkable as it is not based on any marking geographical

differentiation (if we exclude its position), but primarily on linguistic and cultural

factors. However, this position deserves further thought.

Indeed, it was Portugal’s position that enabled its maritime vocation (although it

obviously did not determine it). It is due to its position that Portugal has a more benign

climate than most of the Iberian mini-continent and it is also thanks to its position that

the country has become, from very early on, a platform for supporting the maritime

powers that since then, directly or indirectly, ruled it. As a southern country, although

tempered by the strong influence of its Atlantic coastline, Portugal boasts the majority

of defects and qualities of the people of the South, including polychronism (associated

with the traditional “desenrascanço”, that is, the capacity to” pull a macgyver” and

always come up with a solution to a problem at the last minute with no advanced

planning and no resources).

Ranked by Hofstede among the countries with the greatest “Power Distance”,

Femininity”, “Collectivism” and having also a great need to develop mechanisms for

“Control of Uncertainty”

47

which, according to the social psychologist, are rooted in its

Roman heritage, during a particular time in history Portugal was able to carry out with

notable constancy and determination an expansion that still amazes today, and to build

intercultural and inter-ethnic bridges held until the present day.

48

Persistently poor in natural resources, it lived for centuries out of the exploitation of

the resources in its territories outside Europe, and when that possibility came to an

end, it soon turned to Europe, in defiance of a tradition of many centuries. As a recent

convert, it zealously pursued the objectives of common practices and went further than

most European states in dismantling its primary sector, which puts it in a particularly

vulnerable position before the crisis faced by the Union.

Historically linked to the sea, over the last decades the country has been run mainly by

former emigrants blinded by the European mirage and for whom the sea represented

the nostalgia of the Empire. Accordingly, a formerly relatively large merchant and

44

Low, Polly (2007). Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power, Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

45

Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph (1977). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition,

Boston, Little, Brown and Company.

46

Nogueira, José M. Freire (2004). As guerras Liberais – Uma reflexão Estratégica sobre a História de

Portugal, Lisboa: Cosmos/IDN: 289-290.

47

www.tamas.com/samples/.../Hofstede_Hall.pdf, acceded on 23-09-2011

48

Particularly stressed by the Brazilian Freyre, Gilberto (2001) Casa Grande e Senzala, Lisbon: Livros do

Brasil (original from 1933).

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fishing fleet associated with the ship building and repair industry disappeared, perhaps

for a long time.

Recently, the country seems to have rediscovered the sea. Endowed with a huge EEZ

that it wasted and whose rights are in part in the hands of the EU (article 3 of Title I –

Domains and Competencies of the Union, Treaty of Lisbon), Portugal advocates the

extension of its continental shelf, which, somehow nurturing some megalomania,

would multiply the country by 40! However, for the time being, the exploitation of such

vast resources is merely rhetoric. Whereas the political statements, conferences and

opinion pieces abound, concrete actions are missing.

Mismanaged in general terms, and living from loans (a nineteen century tradition that

came strong into the twentieth century until the Estado Novo, and which was taken up

by the Third Republic…) the country cannot, actually, dream about independent

policies, let alone in an area where the appetites of the “great” of Europe will not fail to

manifest. The great ocean where untold riches lie appears intended to becoming a

bargaining chip against other vital forms of support, regardless of where they come

from.

49

Indeed, Portugal does not seem to do very well in any of the evolution scenarios

proposed. The end of the Union will certainly not be the end of Portugal, but the re-

nationalization of some policies will probably lead to association. If such a catastrophic

scenario leads to the splintering of the Spanish state, an Iberian federalism might

eventually come to the fore and, within it, a state, which at least in name, will be

Portugal.

50

But that state will perhaps have its extra-European links intact, in a way

that no putative Hispanic nation can match. Can we get round history?

Perhaps the best solution for Portugal is the reinforcement of the European Union via

de federal route. I have expressed my strong reservations about this scenario in terms

of geopolitical bias, but it is not impossible. A sort of European “Arkansas” (but

bringing a huge maritime area and transcontinental affinities with it, and guaranteed

the representation of the minorities underlying a federal model) is obviously better

than the tiny state

51

which we may be doomed to becoming with the demise of the

European project.

Portugal seems to do comparatively better in the third hypothesis. Due to its small size

and cohesion, the country would be a natural region with sufficient critical mass in a

Europe of regions, perhaps greater than that which Belgium currently has in the

Europe of Nations.

Finally, and moving to the reign of utopia, and since it cannot counteract its physical

geography, the country could, nevertheless, become an European part of an entity

formed by various continents, as indeed the clever Talleyrand advised the count of

49

For a thorough analysis of the Geopolitics of Portugal see Nogueira, José M. F., O Método Geopolítico

Alargado… cit, passim.

50

Ambassador Franco Nogueira foresaw a similar situation in the book in which he said farewell to politics

and life, writing that “the failure of the Common Market would, first and foremost, be the Iberian

common market, that is, a common market between two very unequal partners, one of which, three or

four times stronger, would easily dominate the other. It would be the Peninsular Common Market,

dominated by the will and the power of the stronger partner, and we all known that economic domination

is followed by political domination”. Nogueira, Franco (1993). Juízo Final, Barcelos: Livraria Civilização:

39.

51

According to the definition by Moreira, Adriano (2009). A Circunstância do Estado Exíguo, Lisbon:

Almedina.

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Palmela during the Vienna Conference in 1815 with regard to the future status of

Brazil.

52

History is far from over…

This paper asks more questions than provides answers, but finding them with realism,

rejecting determinism and thinking out of the box is the responsibility of today’s

European elites, where the Portuguese ones are included. Failure could costs us all

much more than what we can afford to pay.

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