
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 2, n.º 1 (Spring 2011), pp. 44-52
NATO’s new strategic concept: a critical view
Rafael Calduch Cervera
50
On the one hand, the increase in the number of peace missions promoted by the United
Nations which followed, which continues to enjoy political legitimacy and legal
exclusivity, has reinforced the collective dimension of world security.
8
Notwithstanding, it is also evident that the collective security of the United Nations
cannot always be applied, either because it is prevented by the veto system
preponderant in the Security Council or because countries, particularly the super
powers, are not always willing to contribute with the troops the world organization
requires.
The increase in the number and duration of peace missions has brought about the
increasing need to involve regional powers in the decision process and execution of
such missions. We often see the presence of troops from India, Brazil, Pakistan, South
Africa, Canada, Spain, The Netherlands, Portugal, and other countries in these
missions, strengthening and complementing the duties of troops from the United
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, or France.
Likewise, the geo-strategic, political and economic interests of the great powers do not
always coincide with those of the rest of the international community. In similar
circumstances, and in face of the inability to achieve the approval of a Security Council
Resolution that backs its military actions, international interventions have become
generalized, whether unilateral or collective, and directed at defending the interests of
those powers in a certain country or region.
The cases of Kosovo (1999); Iraq (2003); Enduring Freedom (2001) in Afghanistan or,
more recently, Lebanon (2006) and Georgia (2008), more than any argument, illustrate
the reality of the interventionist dimension of the current system of world security.
NATO has defined its strategic performance in this international context in some cases
in accordance with pragmatic criteria, such as in the military intervention in Kosovo,
and, on other occasions, in accordance with international legality criteria, such as in the
case of ISAF.
In the light of the Alliance's evolution in the last two decades, we may and should
conduct an assessment of the new strategic document pointing out three essential
characteristics: a) its political and declarative scope; b) its vagueness; c) and its
incomplete nature. .
In a strict sense, it is not a strategic document, at least not in line with its
predecessors, as it does not have a section on "directions for the forces of the Alliance"
that specifically includes such relevant aspects as: specific missions military forces
must carry out, directives for the disposition of forces, quantitative and qualitative
characteristics of conventional and nuclear forces needed; command structure; etc.
8
For an analysis of the evolution experienced by the United Nations doctrine regarding peace missions,
see the General Secretary documents:
An Agenda for Peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. (17 June 1992). A/47/277
- S/24111
Supplement of “Un Programa de Paz”: Documento de posición del Secretario General presentado con
ocasión del cincuentenario de las Naciones Unidas. (25 January 1995). A/50/60 S/1995/1.
Un mundo más seguro: la responsabilidad que compartimos. Informe del Grupo de alto nivel sobre las
amenazas, los desafíos y el cambio.- Asamblea General (2 December 2004) A/59/565.