OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 1, n.º 1 (Autumn 2010)
Articles
Immanuel Wallerstein – Ecology versus property rights: land in the capitalist world-
economy (1-9)
Miguel Santos Neves – Paradiplomacy, knowledge regions and the consolidation of
«Soft Power» (10-28)
Luís Tomé - Security and security complex: operational concepts (29-44)
António Oliveira – Using the military instrument in conflict resolution: a changing
paradigm (45-58)
José Rebelo - The big information and communication groups in the world (59-69)
Pedro Veiga e Marta Dias – Internet Governance (70-80)
Francisco Rui Cádim
a – Global televisions, a single history (81-91)
João Ferrão – Putting Portugal on the map (92-101)
Notes and Reflections
Luís Moita – The concept of international configuration (102-106)
Nancy Gomes – The role of Portugal in Euro-Latin relations (107-111)
Brígida Rocha Brito - Hard, Soft or Smart Power: conceptual discussion or strategic
definition? (112-114)
Critical Reviews
Noya, Javier (2007). Diplomacia Pública para el siglo XXI. La gestión de la imagen
exterior y la opinión pública internacional. Madrid: Ariel: 469 pp – by Marco
António Baptista Martins (115-118)
Valladares, Rafael (2010). A conquista de Lisboa — Violência militar e comunidade
política em Portugal, 1578-1583. Lisboa: Texto Editores: 332 pp. ISBN 978-972-
47-4111-6 (Tradução Manuel Gonçalves) – by João Maria Mendes (119-120)
Saviano, Roberto (2008). Gomorra. Infiltrado no Império Económico da Máfia
Napolitana, Caderno, 2008, Lisboa, 3ª. Ed.: 351 pp – by René Tapia Ormazábal
(121-124)
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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 1, n.º 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 1-9
ECOLOGY VERSUS PROPERTY RIGHTS:
LAND IN THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY
1
Immanuel Wallerstein
Director of the Fernand Br
audel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and
Civilizations and Senior Research Scholar at the University of Yale.
He is the former President of the International Sociological Association and
Directeur d'études associé at École de Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris.
He is a member of the World Association for International Relations.
Amongst other awards, he was granted an honorary degree by the Universid of Coimbra
Abstract
Access, ownership, and land use for agricultural and living purposes have undergone major
changes over time, particularly with the emergence of the capitalist World-Economy.
The present text offers a reflection on the propositions of property rights, as well as on the
forms of gaining that right, ranging from land seizure, conquest, or “land development”. In
the context of the capitalist World-Economy, the process of legitimization by means of right
to legal ownership is a fundamental process. However, the emergence of social, libertarian,
and resistance movements opposing restrictive property rights has had significant cultural,
political, and economic impacts, in addition to major ecological consequences.
This article offers several examples of the above, with special mention to the important
social movements that have arisen in countries of the global south, and to the natural
resources where impact is mostly felt.
Keyword
Land; Capitalist World-Economy; Property Rights; Ecology
How
to cite this article
Wallerstein, Immanuel (2010) " Ecology versus property rights: land in the capitalist world-
economy". JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, Nº 1, Autumn 2010. Consulted
[online] on date of last visit,
observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol1_n1_art1
Arti
cle received in April 2010 and accepted for publication in September 2010
1
Keynote address at 34th Political Economy of the World-System conference "Land Rights in the World-
System", Florida Atlantic University, April 22, 2010.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 1, n.º 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 1-9
Ecology versus property rights: land in the capitalist world-economy
Immanuel Wallerstein
2
ECOLOGY VERSUS PROPERTY RIGHTS:
LAND IN THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY
Immanuel Wallerstein
The l
and was there before the existence of a capitalist world-economy. And people lived
on the land and off the land. The relationship different peoples had to the land they
used in one way or another varied considerably. There were different customary rules
about rights to utilize the land. The crucial point was that these rules very seldom
existed in written form.
Some peoples were essentially nomadic, which meant they physically moved over time
from place to place, although the range of places may have been constrained by
customary agreements. Other peoples engaged in settled agriculture, which usually
implied some right to land usage, and some possibility of inheritance of these rights. In
many situations, there were persons who did not use the land themselves for
production but claimed the right to receive transfers of the usufruct in one form or
another from the direct users. Generically, we may call them overlords, who often
repaid these transfers by offering some kind of protection to the direct producers. It
was seldom the case that individuals, either direct users or overlords, had the kind of
title to the land that legitimated the sale of their rights to others.
The coming into existence of the capitalist world-economy changed all this in
fundamental ways, creating new constraints on utilizing the land for productive
purposes. It is these constraints that I wish to explore in this paper, which raises more
questions than it offers a series of analytic propositions about land rights in the world-
system.
1. Title to the Land
The single most important change imposed by the modern world-system is that it
estab
lished a systematic legal basis for what is called title to the land. That is to say,
rules were created by which an individual or a corporate entity could "own" land
outright. Owning land - that is, property rights - meant that one could use the land in
any way one wanted, subject only to specific limitations established by the laws of the
sovereign state within which this unit of land was located. Land to which one had title
was land that one could bequeath to heirs or sell to other persons or corporate entities.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 1, n.º 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 1-9
Ecology versus property rights: land in the capitalist world-economy
Immanuel Wallerstein
3
How did one acquire title to land that previously had no title in this specific legal sense?
The answer by and large was that one seized such land and simply proclaimed oneself
owner of the land. Sometimes this occurred by legal authorization from a superoverlord
(like a king). And sometimes it occurred in situations of conquest of a region by a state,
which then authorized such seizures. Usually the conquering state initially authorized
such seizures to participants in the conquest. And then later, this authorization might
have been extended to anyone the conquering state in question wished to permit to
seize the land.
Generally, this was considered "development" of the land - or in that wonderful French
expression "mise en valeur." Let us dwell for a moment on the French expression - in
wide use until at least 1945. Literally, the word "valeur" means "value." So if one put
something (mise) into value, one means that it then acquired value within a capitalist
economic system. Presumably, before the "mise en valeur," it did not have such value;
and afterwards, it did.
Of course, in almost every case, this land previously had been "used" for some purpose
by someone. However, once title was granted to a seizer, the person or group that
previously "used" the land lost whatever customary rights they had had, or thought
they had had, to the land. Quite often, they were literally evicted from the land. Or
else, they were allowed to remain on the land in some subordinate capacity, as defined
by the person who now held title to the land. Such seizure of previously untitled land
has been going on for the past five centuries. It is still going on today in whatever units
of land still remain somehow outside the domain of land to which there is legal title.
Seized land may, under certain political conditions, be reseized by persons who do not
have legal title. This is largely done by what we call "squatting" on the land. There are
today organized social movements which proclaim the moral and political right to
squat, particularly if the land in question is not being used actively, or if the person
who has title is a distant landlord. In many cases, the squatters are actual cultivators of
the land who however do not have legal title. For example, the Movimento dos
Trabalhadores Sem Terra (MST) is a powerful social movement in Brazil that specifically
works to permit reseizure of the land. They seek further, so far without much success,
to get the Brazilian government to legitimate such reseizure. Squatting also occurs in
urban zones in unoccupied buildings.
Of course, the government itself can reseize land, by a legal process called eminent
domain. This has often occurred in various parts of the world. Normally to invoke
eminent domain the government must proclaim some social interest of the state in
preempting usage of the land. They may seize the land of small landowners in order to
give it to larger landowners, in order that the latter “develop" it in some way that is
deemed more productive. But the government may also do it as a political gesture, to
take land from persons considered outside/foreign settlers and "restore" it to persons
considered somehow indigenous to the state.
Both government seizure for "development" and squatting can, and do, occur not only
in rural areas, where the land is used for some agrarian purpose but in urban areas
where the land is used first of all for housing. Government seizures on behalf of
corporate housing developers occur with some frequency. But seizure by squatting is
also commonplace. These days, large urban areas, particularly in the Global South,
have extensive zones of settlement (such as bidonvilles, favelas, etc.) in which there is
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 1, n.º 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 1-9
Ecology versus property rights: land in the capitalist world-economy
Immanuel Wallerstein
4
such squatting - sometimes tolerated de facto by the legal authorities, sometimes
repressed, provided the state has sufficient means to suppress it.
The basic point is that title to the land is fundamentally a political question masked by a
legal veneer. Title to the land may or may not be enforced by legal authorities, who are
thereby making a political decision. In this regard, Proudhon's famous slogan, property
is theft, is no doubt the most apt description of land title.
The main ongoing legal and political issue is what happens after the initial seizure. If a
piece of property is acquired by theft, and is passed down to descendants for multiple
generations thereafter, or sold to others, does de facto continuity of legal ownership
confer either moral or legal rights to the land? This is the issue raised today by
movements of so-called indigenous peoples that are laying claim either to recovery of
land (full ownership) or at least to financial compensation for land that had been seized
- in many cases, centuries earlier.
Virtually the entire land area of so-called lands of settlement was originally seized in
this manner. This applies notably to areas of overseas European settlement - North
America, Australasia, the southern cone of Latin America, southern Africa, and Israel. It
applies however as well to the areas of purely land-based European expansion, as
Russia into Siberia and the Caucasus. Actually, of course, the same process is to be
found in the expansion in those areas wherein stronger non-European groups move into
adjoining areas that are weaker politically. This is what has happened historically in
China, in India, and in the many parts of Africa that were not White settler areas.
The main point is that the process of legitimating ownership by legal title is a
fundamental process of the capitalist world-economy. And its origin almost always lay
in seizure by force. But since it has been a virtually universal practice, undoing this
process is akin to leveling the Himalayas or the Alps. I suppose it might be technically
possible but it is politically impossible. This does not mean that adjustments cannot be
made as a result of pressure by social movements. But any adjustments would
necessarily constitute unsatisfactory compromises of mutually incompatible assertions
of moral and legal rights.
Why do people seize land? The obvious primary answer is that it is economically
profitable in some way to do so. It may be profitable because the land offers good
possibilities for production for the market. But it may also be indirectly profitable
because it pushes some people off the land, and such persons may then have to seek
remunerative employment elsewhere, and thereby serve the need of capitalist
producers elsewhere.
Of course, some of the land seized may not in itself offer much opportunity for
profitable production. It may be seized for "strategic" reasons - to defend the
collectivity of owners from counterpressures or countermovements; to guarantee the
possibilities for long-range transportation of merchandise; or simply to deny the use of
the land to other states or their citizens.
2. Space
The amount of land that is governed by title is, even today, not 100% of the global
l
a
n
d
surface. But it has grown as a percentage of the total global land surface
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Ecology versus property rights: land in the capitalist world-economy
Immanuel Wallerstein
5
throughout the history of the modern world-system. Some people have always fought
back, resisting the demand to create title on the land they have customarily used. And
some people have escaped the consequences of their land having been seized by
fleeing to other land areas that are more remote from the persons engaged in doing
the seizing. This is what James Scott has called "the art of not being governed." It
accounts for the emergence and creation of zones in, for example, high mountainous
areas, which are considered both "traditional" and "primitive" by the holders of titled
land rights. These same zones however are considered zones of libertarian resistance
by those who have thus escaped. These zones are as doubtfully "traditional" (that is,
pre-modern) as most other phenomena we like to brand negatively as traditional.
The basic pressure on those who have sought to escape the process of the assertion of
restrictive land rights has been population growth. We know that the population of the
world has been growing steadily for the past 500 years. With only marginal exceptions
- the results of landfills - the area of the globe on which people can live has remained
the same. So, there are continuously more people per square mile globally.
Population growth has led to two forms of expansion. There is extensive growth, the
bringing of more and more land areas into the system of titled land. But there is also
intensive growth, the ever greater concentration of the population of the world into
close-contact areas. We call this urbanization. This is a process no one doubts and
which, in the last fifty years, has accelerated at a breathtaking rate, such that we have
moved into a world of multiple megalopolises, with the prospect of still more and still
larger ones in the decades to come.
The two processes together - extensive and intensive occupation of land areas
governed by the legal processes of the world-system - have created a whole range of
additional constraints on the ways in which the capitalist world-economy operates. It
seems elementary to observe that the situation of more people on the same amount of
land creates a pressure on every conceivable kind of resource that humans need to
survive. It also seems elementary to observe that if humans appropriate more land,
they inevitably have to eliminate competing users of the land - mostly fauna but also
flora.
While these processes have been in operation throughout the history of the capitalist
world-economy, they have become a cultural and political issue particularly in the last
fifty years, as the ecological effects of the modern world-system have become more
and more obvious and the negative aspects more and more blatant.
The first problem is water. Water is essential to life processes. The amount of usable
water in the world is not unlimited. One of the controversial features of land title is the
degree to which it involves total control of water resources that are accessible on the
titled land in question. The water conflicts between settled farmers and ranchers are so
central to the modern world that much modern fiction is devoted to discussing it. The
conflict between rural users and urban consumers is equally notorious.
What happens as a consequence? Governments make decisions about allocations,
which they then implement by various alterations of the land surface in order to ensure
certain kinds of flows of water that give preferential access to water to particular
groups. The construction of dams is one tried and true technique of doing this. When
dams change the flow of water and access to the water, they of course affect most
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 1, n.º 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 1-9
Ecology versus property rights: land in the capitalist world-economy
Immanuel Wallerstein
6
immediately the land rights of owners and users in or near the trajectory of the rivers
that are being dammed.
There is however an additional more long-term effect. The process of altering flows and
access leads over time to more extensive usage of the available water and eventually
to desertification. This thereby reduces the available water supply at the very same
time as the numbers of persons seeking water worldwide has increased.
Furthermore, this is more than a question of the use of water that is located in rivers
and lakes and in the water table underneath the land areas. The demand for food
resources leads to more and more intensive usage of the ocean areas as sources of
food supply. Title to ocean areas has been increasingly asserted by the states. The
historic claim that a three-mile zone at the edge of land frontiers falls under a state's
sovereignty has escalated in recent decades into claims for a 200-mile zone. And
tomorrow still wider zones will almost surely be claimed.
The commodification of water - by individuals, by enterprises, and by states - has
expanded enormously, as the reality of worldwide water shortages has become more
evident. Of course, commodification of a vital resource means that there results
increasingly unequal allocation of the resource. Water struggles have thus become a
central focus worldwide of the class struggle.
What is true of water is equally true of food and energy resources. If there are more
people in the world, it means that more total food resources are needed. Since land is
increasingly appropriated for human use, there is less room for animals that roam. The
world has turned therefore to farming animal resources - that is, concentrating their
location in small, enclosed areas, controlled by ever larger corporate enterprises. This
not only polarizes distribution but has important negative health consequences both for
the humans and the animals.
The interstate conflicts over access to energy have become the everyday story of the
media. What is also much discussed these days is the ecological dangers resulting from
the kinds of energy utilized, and its impact on world climatic conditions. This is in turn
leading to one of the last but not least commodifications, that of the air we breathe.
Title to land meant initially title to what was on the land surface. But quite quickly, it
was extended to mean what lies beneath the land surface, and more recently to what is
in the oceans. Now it has begun to be asserted to the air rights above the land surface.
As more and more goods are produced on less and less land area per person in the
world, the issue of the disposal of toxic waste has loomed heavily. Who has title to
toxic waste, and where can it be deposited in a system in which there is title to land?
We know what is happening. As the dangers of toxic waste to human survival have
become more well-known, it has become less and less legitimate to dispose of it in the
public domain. This is not to say that such disposal has ceased - far from it - but it has
become less legitimate and therefore the disposers act more secretively.
The alternative to disposal in the public domain is disposal by purchased access to land
(or water) zones to which others have title. Where this can be done is of course in
direct correlation with the relative strength of zones within the world-system. In
wealthier zones, political resistance to purchased waste disposal sites is strong and
relatively effective. This is the so-called NIMBY phenomenon. The purchase of rights
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 1, n.º 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 1-9
Ecology versus property rights: land in the capitalist world-economy
Immanuel Wallerstein
7
tends therefore to mean increasingly purchases in the Global South, which further
increases the polarization of the world-system.
Once again, this affects the land rights of those closest to the disposal areas. But it also
affects the long-term class struggle - in this case not over access but over non-access.
The basic issue can be readily summed up. More people equal more resource needs. To
the extent that resources are allocated within a system of title to land rights, the result
is fewer resources per person, more commodification, more ecological damage, and
more acute class struggle worldwide.
3. Pe
ople and Peoples
After 500 years of the operation of a capitalist world-economy, where are we today, in
terms of both people and peoples? That is, what has been the impact on the lives of
individuals? And what has been the impact on the lives of groups? And perhaps most
importantly, what can either individuals or groups do about this impact? And what are
they doing about it?
If we start with people as individuals or quite small groups like families, it is quite clear
that their options and their freedom of action is constrained in very important ways as
the result of creating a system in which the use of land is governed by so-called title,
that is, by property relations.
It is reasonably important to look carefully at the concept of freedom of action. At a
superficial level, acquiring title to land seems to enhance individual rights. The owner
can dispose of this property as the owner wishes, subject to a small number of legal
limitations. The owner, it is argued, benefits directly from the owner's work input, in
that the owner can retain the benefits of improving the property.
This is no doubt more or less accurate. However, it leaves out of the equation the
unequal strength of different property-owners, and therefore of the ability of larger,
stronger owners to outcompete smaller ones and in effect force a transfer of ownership.
This is what we call concentration of capital.
An obvious simple example can illustrate this. Take two instances of where collective
property without individual rights to title existed and then was transformed into
individual rights to a small portion of the collective property. One would be a rural zone
in the Global South previously outside the system of titled land rights. A second would
be collective property in the ex-Communist states in the period following 1989. In both
cases, mandated privatization of the property created multiple small owners who
however were unable to maintain the property in a market situation. They thereupon
sold their rights to some larger entrepreneur. At the end of this process, they had lost
all rights within the erstwhile collective property, and economically were likely to be
worse off than before.
As we have seen, this is only a small part of the story. If we look at the demographic
and ecological consequences of the system over 500 years, we observe a considerable
and growing polarization of the world-system which, at an individual level, has
translated into a vast growing population who live below what is considered the
"poverty level." This is often masked by the considerably improved situation for
perhaps 15-20% of the world's population.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
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Ecology versus property rights: land in the capitalist world-economy
Immanuel Wallerstein
8
What has happened to individual people is perhaps less dramatic than what has
happened to peoples. Groups of people - peoples - all like to assert their eternal
existence and their eternal moral right to exist and persist. This is of course mythology.
Groups come into and out of existence all the time, and always have.
Is there something different about this process within the framework of the modern
world-system? Well, yes and no. The answer is no if one emphasizes the fact that
groups have lives, that they are constantly changing in structure and design, in values
and boundaries, in size and importance.
But the answer is yes if we look at how groups come into and out of existence in the
modern world-system, as contrasted with how they did so previously. It has very much
to do with land rights. The modern world-system has made possible, via technological
improvements, larger and more rapid movements of peoples. We lump all these
movements under the vague cover label of migration. But this greater technological
facility of movement has occurred at the same time that there has been created an
historical system that is composed of so-called sovereign states within an interstate
system. These states have boundaries (albeit changing ones). And by systemic
definition, there are no zones outside this carving up of the world into sovereign states
(except marginally, and perhaps not for very much longer, the once totally-unoccupied
Antarctic).
Sovereign states, as part of their mechanism of survival as institutions, have by and
large all sought to become so-called nation-states. That is, they have all (or almost all)
practiced an underlying Jacobin ideology of integration. They have wanted to insist that
the multiple peoples located within their borders become part of the one people that is
being asserted as the legitimate expression of membership in the community of the
state.
In addition, in-migrants to the state have been regularly asked to surrender previous
cultural identities and submit to the dominant one of the putative nation-state. Once
again, however, this is essentially a political question. And in the past half-century,
there have been important movements of resistance to this process. The resistance
first of all has been the work of groups that consider themselves somehow more
indigenous to the region than others - for example, within the settler states. Or they
have been the resistance of groups who have been conquered by more powerful
neighbors and are seeking to "revive" their language or their autonomous institutions.
Today centrifugal forces are coming to be at least the equal of centripetal forces within
the political-cultural lives of the world's states. The virtues of being a pluri-national
state or a multi-cultural state are now being proclaimed in some countries.
The hard, cold fact is that there is no real possibility of creating truly multi-national
states with different policies in different zones concerning land rights, except possibly
when the so-called indigenous populations are an absolute majority of the population,
as in Bolivia. The clearest instance of this impossibility is occurring right now in
Ecuador.
Ecuador is considered by world standards a state governed by left forces, one of the
most radical politically in Latin America. The current president, Rafael Correa, was
elected with the strong support of the federation of indigenous movements in Ecuador,
CONAIE. He is today in deep conflict with CONAIE. What happened?
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
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Ecology versus property rights: land in the capitalist world-economy
Immanuel Wallerstein
9
The policies that give Correa the image of a political radical in today's world is first of
all that he takes much geopolitical distance from the United States, and secondly his
stance in regard to the foreign mining companies that have held various kinds of
concessions in mineral-rich Ecuador. He moved to revoke many of these concessions in
order to force the mining companies to renegotiate the terms of their arrangements. He
did this in order to obtain far greater revenues for the Ecuadorian government in order
to "develop" in various ways the country. Such attempts to reduce the advantages of
foreign corporations in favor of higher revenues for the states in which these
corporations operate have been a standard element in world politics for at least half a
century and have been generally considered to be a mark of a left position in world
politics.
CONAIE is not opposed to reducing the power and advantages of foreign miming
corporations. But they represent those parts of the population who are still largely
living on land that is not titled. The groups they represent also are disproportionately
located in the regions in which mining has been or will be undertaken. They therefore
are the most immediately subject to the negative ecological consequences of such
operations as well as to the land displacement consequences that have occurred or may
occur in the future.
The position of CONAIE is that Ecuador should change its constitution to proclaim itself
a pluri-national state. Furthermore, they demand the right of the indigenous
communities to give prior consent before extractive projects occur in their region. In
part, they intend to deny such rights, although it is possible they will also in part simply
demand control over the income that may come from consent, control that would
otherwise fall to the Ecuadorian state. Correa and CONAIE have also come into conflict
over water. In this matter too, the government wished to control access to water
resources, including the possibility of privatizing it. CONAIE insisted on absolute public
and community control over water resources.
Finally, there was a dispute over the prospection for oil in a national park area called
Yasuni. Correa took the position that the government might renounce such prospection
if countries in the North compensated it for the loss of revenue, a proposal that did not
go very far. He has reserved the right to proceed with prospection, with the strong
support of the national oil corporation, Petroecuador.
This account of recent events in Ecuador illustrates the fundamental dilemma of the
world left. On the one hand, the world left, especially in the Global South, has stood for
measures that would reduce the enormous real gap with the Global North. Correa is
simply pursuing this objective. On the other hand, the world left (or at least a growing
portion of it) is standing against further commodification of land rights and further
ecological degradation of the world. CONAIE is simply pursuing this objective.
The two strategies are contradictory and incompatible one with the other. Land rights
stand as the crucial deciding point. It is not at all clear today which way the world left,
as social movement, intends to go. At the moment, collectively it seems to be trying to
go in both directions at the same time. This is difficult, indeed probably impossible. The
conflicts within the world left about their fundamental strategy of global change risks
canceling all possibility of a successful outcome in the continuing struggle over the
successor system to a capitalist world-economy that is in structural crisis.
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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 1, n.º 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 10-28
PARADIPLOMACY, KNOWLEDGE REGIONS AND THE CONSOLIDATION
OF “SOFT POWER”
Miguel Santos Neves
PhD by the London
School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, Professor in
the Law and International Relations Departments of Universidade Autonóma de Lisboa, Director
of the Asia Programme and the Migrations Programme of the Institute of International and
Strategic Studies (IEEI) in Portugal.
Resumo
The paper analyses the nature and features of the Knowledge Regions and their emergence
in the international system as strategic players in the process of glocalization, strongly
anchored in the creation of dense knowledge networks and the development of an active
paradiplomacy which enables the regions to project externally their specific interests and to
reinforce their influence in the process of multilevel governance functioning as strategic
brokers between the global and the local. In this context the paper discusses the
implications of the paradiplomacy of sub-national governments to the foreign policies of
central governments and argues that not only paradiplomacy does not present a risk to the
coherence of foreign policy but constitutes a major factor for the consolidation of the soft
power of states.
Keywords
Knowledge regions, Paradiplomacy; Glocalisation; Knowledge
networks; “Soft Power”
How to cite this article
Neves, Miguel Santos (2010). "Paradiplomacy, knowledge regions and theconsolidation of
«Soft Power»". JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, N.º 1, Autumn 2010.
Consulted [online] on date of last visit,
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Article received in August 2010 and accepted for publication in August 2010
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 1, n.º 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 10-28
Paradiplomacy, knowledge regions and the consolidation of “Soft Power”
Miguel Santos Neves
11
PARADIPLOMACY, KNOWLEDGE REGIONS AND THE CONSOLIDATION
OF SOFT POWER
Miguel Santos Neves
Introduction
The increasing complexity of the international system is particularly illustrated by the
heter
ogeneity of players and the growing influence of non-state actors as well as by the
existence of a system of multilayered and diffused governance, where there is
coexistence and interplay between supranational, regional, national and sub-national
levels, not the monopoly of the global level, leading to a considerable ambiguity in the
international system, namely about the exact location of authority, its fragmentation
and the management of overlapping jurisdictions and rules.
The major structural changes societies and the international system are experiencing
are determined not only by globalization but also by two other distinct processes which
are intertwined with it: the emergence of the “knowledge-based society” and the
“network society”. The processes of globalization and of building the knowledge society
originated two different phenomena which are apparently contradictory. Globalization is
behind the development of macro-regionalism insofar as macro-regions enable the
exploration of scale economies, the rationalization of production systems and
transaction costs and the development of transparent competition rules. In contrast the
knowledge-based society has worked in a different direction introducing the dimension
of "localization" and stimulating the development of micro-regionalism. There is
sufficient evidence to support the argument that the evolution of the world economy is
not simply characterised by globalization but by “glocalization”, a more complex
process involving simultaneously globalization and localization.
Knowledge regions, strongly anchored in multi-actor knowledge networks and a
proactive paradiplomatic international action, have emerged as relevant players in the
international system and the real competitors in the global economy. The paper is
structured in three parts. The first part discusses the main factors behind the
emergence of the micro knowledge regions in the context of the process of
glocalisation. The second part analyses the features and dynamics of knowledge
regions both the old ones in advanced countries but also the new ones in the emerging
economic powers, China, Brazil and India. The third part addresses the phenomenon of
paradiplomacy and its strong linkages with knowledge regions and discusses the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 1, n.º 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 10-28
Paradiplomacy, knowledge regions and the consolidation of “Soft Power”
Miguel Santos Neves
12
implications of the new knowledge society paradigm in terms of changes in the
philosophy and practice of foreign policy.
Globalisation, knowledge society and the emergence of knowledge
regions
The international system has been experiencing not only a process of globalisation but
more precisely a dual process of “globalisation cum localisation” which some authors
have named glocalization or fragmegration
1
. The joint effect of this globalisation-
local
isation process, with their points of complementarity and their contradictions, is
inducing a major paradigm shift in societal structures, in the way the economy and
markets function and states operate and how citizens relate to each other and to the
state
Globalisation has been a widely discussed topic but still remains a rather ambiguous
concept with at least four different meanings to it
2
. The first perspective sees
globalisation as internationalisation, stressing the intensification of interaction and
increasing interdependence between countries/states. A second view equates
globalization with liberalization, implying the elimination of barriers to the free flow of
goods, capital and people, the reduction of state restrictions and deregulation. Thirdly,
globalization has also been regarded as universalisation, implying the creation of global
norms and values (by states) and gradual reduction of cultural differences. Finally,
globalisation can also be seen as deterritorialisation, reflecting the fact the territory, a
fundamental basis of organisation of westphalian sovereign states, lost relevance as
transnational networks and new forms of social organisation that transcend territorial
borders emerged and non-state actors became increasingly influential at the
international level. Unlike the others, the last meaning implies a qualitative change and
distances itself from the state-centric approach insofar it underlines the new role and
influence of non-state actors.
Localisation is associated with the emergence of knowledge-based economies and
societies which are those where knowledge became the determinant factor of
innovative production (new products, production processes and organizational
methods), and innovation the key ingredient behind competitiveness. The most
valuable aspect in the production of knowledge is the investment not in physical capital
but above all in intangible assets: human capital, knowledge capital and social capital.
In the knowledge society social activities are particularly geared towards the
production, the distribution and effective use of knowledge which allows for the
capacity to create and innovate new ideas, thoughts, processes and products and to
translate them into economic value and wealth. On the other hand, the knowledge
society is also a learning society where there is a strong priority attached to learning
and “learning how to learn” which conditions the sustainability of the process.
In stressing the centrality of the process of knowledge creation and diffusion it is
important to point out not only that there are different types of knowledge but also that
1
See James Rosenau (2002). “Governance in a new Global Order”. In David Held and McGrew (eds.)
Gover
ning Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, Cambridge Polity Press: 70-86.
2
Dominique Moisi, IFRI (2001). “The Knowledge-based society – beyond IT revolution”, paper presented at
the Annual EU-Japan Journalists Conference: Reacting to the knowledge-based society: European and
Japanese views, Dublin, 7-9 March.
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Paradiplomacy, knowledge regions and the consolidation of “Soft Power”
Miguel Santos Neves
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some have a higher strategic value than others. An important distinction to be made
between two fundamental types of knowledge: (i) Coded knowledge (know-what and
know-why) which can be equated with information and easily acceded through
databases, books or lectures; (ii) Tacit knowledge (know-how and know-who) which is
more difficult to have access to insofar it presupposes practical experience and social
practice, in particular the know-who which is socially embedded knowledge that can not
easily be transferred through formal channels.
“Tacit Knowledge” is the most decisive and strategic kind of knowledge because it is
crucial to interpret, select and integrate coded knowledge, as well as to learn new skills
and forget old ones. Moreover, with the advances in information technologies the
increasingly cheap and easy access to vast information makes tacit knowledge even
more relevant because it is scarcer and selection and interpretation of coded knowledge
becomes paramount.
The creation and diffusion of tacit knowledge, unlike coded knowledge, requires a social
context, face-to-face interaction and trust and it is unlikely to be transferred on an
anonymous base. This is where the “network society” factor has to be accounted for, in
the sense that the social networks that involve a diversity of actors and contribute to
the upgrading of the level of social capital
3
– i.e. the capacity members of a society
have
to develop mutual trust and cooperate to achieve common goals - is a
fundamental condition for the creation of tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is
considered to be only transferable among actors who share norms and values and
possess a high level of social capital.
The transition to the knowledge society/economy has become a key issue in the
strategic thinking of many societies and states and is gradually becoming a priority in
the political agenda of governments. Thus far, this trend involves mainly “strong
states,” developed countries or emerging new powers, which already have a strong
position in the global economy. The analysis of the EU Lisbon Strategy and the updated
“Europe 2020: a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”; Japan’s
“Innovation 25” strategy, the US “American Competitiveness Initiative”; Brazil’s
Programa “Três Tempos”; China’s “Harmonious Socialist Strategy” already made
operational in the 11
th
Five-Year Plan and updated in the 12
th
Five-Year Plan (2011-
2015)
currently in its final process of approval; or India’s 11
th
Five-Year Plan, shows
that, since the late 1990s, these actors have engaged in the formulation and
implementation of strategies to facilitate a transition to a knowledge society/economy
4
.
The relationship between the two processes of globalization and knowledge-society is
rather complex. Globalization is at the same time undermining localisation, insofar
instantaneous transfer of information regardless of location undercut traditional
competitive factors such as proximity to inputs and markets, and reinforcing
localisation as this ability to source from anywhere becomes open to everyone and
therefore ceases to be an advantage. In this context the “location paradox” emerges in
the sense that “…the most enduring competitive advantages in a global economy seem
3
In the sense of the concept developed by Putnam, see Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in
Modern Italy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993.
4
Neves, Miguel (2007). “National Experiences in Managing the transitions towards a knowledge
Society/Economy - Same Dreams, Different Beds”. In Estratégia, nº 22-23, IEEI.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
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Paradiplomacy, knowledge regions and the consolidation of “Soft Power”
Miguel Santos Neves
14
to be local” as argued by Porter
5
. Moreover, the environmental costs of globalisation
are now increasingly at stake. The pressing standards of corporate environmental
responsibility and the concerns over climate change and the reduction of CO2
emissions, questions the sustainability of the fragmentation of globalized production
processes pressing for location near the consumer markets in order to minimise
emissions thus providing new advantages to localisation.
Michael Enright
6
argues that this is only an apparent paradox as this twin process tends
to be essentially complementary insofar the process of localisation of competitive
advantages of firms is a necessary condition to compete in the global market. In other
words, firms have first to consolidate their knowledge creation and innovation
capabilities in their local/regional clusters and networks, as innovation is today the
main driving force behind competitiveness, in order to meet the new challenges of
globalisation.
However, I would argue that there is not only complementarity and convergence; there
is also divergence, tension and contradictory effects between the two at different
levels.
Firstly, while globalisation reduces the relevance of the territory in the old way, the
knowledge society grants a new strategic significance to the territory. Given the
centrality of tacit knowledge and the fact its creation requires direct social interaction
on a territorial base, we can then understand how the knowledge society and the
network society processes have contributed for the territory to regain importance but in
a new perspective: not because it is controlled by the state or is the basis for the
exercise of sovereignty, but because of the social activity that takes place there and the
density of the knowledge networks. Knowledge creation became a territorialized
phenomenon, insofar it enables national/regional actors to develop trust, form
networks, produce common norms and values, develop partnerships and engage in
mutual learning.
From this perspective, the knowledge society and economy contradicts the opposite
trend of deterritorialisation set in motion by globalisation. As a consequence the local
and regional levels gained a new strategic value, because it is the optimal dimension
for the creation and operation of the knowledge networks that produce and diffuse tacit
knowledge.
Secondly, globalisation generates a concentration of economic power, setting in motion
a complex process of mergers and acquisitions which have been taking place in many
sectors, while the knowledge society tends to generate greater dispersion of power and
assets and to stimulate co-operation. This concentration of economic power and the
formation of major conglomerates in the financial sector is clearly one of the structural
causes behind the current financial and economic crisis insofar it created the syndrome
of “too big to fail” and weakened the capacity of states to carry out effective regulation
and moderate market abuses and anti-social behaviour of conglomerates.
At the same
time this same process weakened the glocalisation process insofar global banks bought
or pushed out of the market smaller regional/local banks with closer ties with the local
5
Michael Porter (2000). “Location, Competition and Economic Development: Local Clusters in a Global
Economy“. In Economic Development Quarterly, 14: 15-34.
6
Enright, OECD (2001). Enhancing SME competitiveness. The OECD Bologna Ministerial Conference, Paris,
Background paper for workshop 2.
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economy and institutions: as a consequence credit became less accessible to SMEs
clusters and knowledge networks
7
.
Thirdly, in terms of policy responses, globalisation requires from the point of view of
regulation the fight against monopolies / dominant positions and strict enforcement of
competition rules while the knowledge society/economy implies a logic of greater
cooperation between firms, universities, research centres, local governments, NGOs
and other partners that integrate the knowledge networks and greater tolerance with
regard to practices that from a formal perspective could be seen as violating
competition rules. In other words, the new paradigm of the knowledge society has far
reaching institutional and regulatory implications insofar it requires a flexibilisation of
rules in several areas notably in competition and intellectual property rights in order to
remove major obstacles to knowledge diffusion.
Fourthly, globalisation is behind the development of macro-regionalism and regional
integration while the knowledge society is favouring an opposite trend of micro-
regionalism, thus facilitating the development of two different kinds of regionalism with
two different logics.
The development of this new micro-regionalism is anchored on, and driven by the
emergence of the knowledge regions, a new actor both in terms of knowledge creation
and innovation and of governance whose strategic relevance derives from the very
nature of tacit knowledge production and dissemination as will be discussed below.
The new strategic relevance of the knowledge regions is associated with different
factors.
To begin with, the necessity to introduce new forms of Governance within states that
induced decentralisation and devolution of powers to sub-national governments. The
systemic effects of globalisation caused the weakening of the Westephalian state,
although with considerable differences between strong and weak states, as a result of
the incapacity of central bureaucracies to deal effectively with a whole new range of
complex issues, the growing power of non-state actors and the emergence of new
sources of loyalty and identity that compete with nationality.
Secondly, the knowledge regions emerged as the systemic mediators between the local
and the global managing contradictions and addressing the new multi-level governance
challenges. To a large extent they are the real competitors in the global economy and
acquired a deep understanding about its logic and dynamics. One can argue that it is
regions rather than countries that are competing in the global economy. Conversely at
the local level they function both as the catalysts of the organisation of local actors’
strategies and actions to pursue their interests in the global economy and as the safety
net to cushion negative effects of globalisation, thus contributing to social stability.
Thirdly, the relevance of the knowledge regions derives also from their strategic role in
strengthening Global Governance insofar they operate already on the basis of multi-
actor knowledge networks whose expertise is required to respond to the complex
regulation of very technical issues. This puts knowledge regions in a privileged position
to provide inputs to global rule-making. Similarly, they have a crucial role to play as far
as rule-implementation and adaptation to local conditions and specificities are
7
See Stiglitz, Joseph (2006). Making Globalization Work, Penguin Books.
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concerned, thus being a strategic player in ensuring both the voluntary compliance to
and enforcement of global rules.
Knowledge regions: features and dynamics
The concept of Knowledge Regions is relatively recent and there is not yet a consensus
about its precise contents. However, it is clear that the concept refers to micro-regions,
territorial units which are parts of a State, that operate as regional innovation systems
according to the new logic of the knowledge economy and society. Although the focus
has been more on national knowledge regions I would argue that transborder regions
involving parts of different states cutting across political boundaries can also constitute
knowledge regions (transborder). In spite of the fluidity of the concept, I would argue
that a comparative analysis suggests that knowledge regions display some fundamental
common features which go far beyond economic aspects to include sociological,
governance and political dimensions. The most fundamental features include the
following aspects:
(i) High level of human capital as a result of a consistent level of investment,
especially in education and training, with important consequences not only in
terms of productivity but also in terms of acquisition of new skills, innovation
capacity and learning capabilities.
(ii) High investment in R&D, public and private, and efficiency of the system
translated in good performance as far as outputs are concerned, particularly
patents.
(iii) Possession of a core group of knowledge-intensive industries and/or knowledge
services which play a strategic role in securing innovation and competitiveness: IT
and computer manufacturing (computer and office equipment, electronic
components, communication equipment); Biotechnology and chemical sectors
(pharmaceuticals, drugs, chemical products); Automotive and high-technology
mechanical engineering (motor vehicles and transport equipment, machine tools
and equipment); Instrumentation and electrical machinery (precision and optical
equipment, electrical transmission equipment, lighting and wiring equipment);
High-technology services (software and computer related services,
telecommunications, research, consultancy, development and testing service).
(iv) High level of social capital, implying good levels of cooperation and trust between
members of the community, which favours the development of dense regional
networks between regional knowledge actors, enhancing the capacity to produce
and diffuse tacit knowledge.
(v) Communities characterised by a strong multicultural trait, associated with the
presence of a significant foreign community from a variety of countries and
cultures, also because as dynamic innovation poles they attract talents from other
countries and regions, which facilitates a better knowledge about other cultures
and visions of the world.
(vi) New forms of governance, less hierarchical and more participatory, which put
great emphasis on active public-private partnerships, devolution of powers to local
governments and new forms of articulation between different levels of
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government and policies aimed at facilitating entrepreneurship in both public and
private sectors.
(vii) High international profile in many cases associated with a reasonable level of
international participation based on a proactive paradiplomacy in areas of low
politics carried out by sub-national governments in close co-ordination with the
private sector and civil society organisations.
This illustrates the complex, multidimensional and far-reaching structural changes that
underpin the emergence of knowledge regions. It should be noted that these traits are
tendencies and therefore they are combined in very different proportions in different
regions, some might even be absent or not fully consolidated in specific regions.
Moreover, despite the commonalities mentioned above there is not a homogeneous
model of knowledge region; there are obviously many points of divergence and
different degrees of maturity between different experiences.
Comparative analysis of Knowledge Regions has been carried out by Robert Huggins
8
who h
as been producing the World Knowledge Competitiveness Index. This Index is an
overall benchmark of the knowledge capacity, capability and sustainability of the best
performing and most dynamic regions in the global economy.
The World Knowledge Competitiveness Index 2008 provides the most recent analysis of
the performance of the leading knowledge regions in the world. It compares 145
regions - 63 from North America (USA and Canada), 54 from Europe and 28 from Asia
and Oceania – and is headed by the San José region in the US followed by other US
regions. In the top 10 there are two non-US regions Stockholm (6
th
) the best
performing European region and Tokyo (9
th
) the best performing Asian region. The top
50 rank is dominated by US regions but includes 13 European regions and 9 Asian
regions. At the bottom of the ranking we find the Chinese and Indian regions as well as
regions from Eastern Europe. It is interesting to note that all the most developed
Chinese coastal regions are now integrated in the group.
Comparing the 2008 results with the 2005 Index it is possible to conclude that while
the leading knowledge centres are still in the US, the American predominance is less
overwhelming insofar there is a clear improvement in the performance of the
knowledge centres outside the US, namely in the EU and Japan which place 13 regions
(7 in 2005) and 7 regions (1 in 2005) respectively in the top 50 knowledge regions.
Moreover, there are few US regions that have improved their position since 2005 which
suggests that the considerable gap between US regions and European and Asian
regions is narrowing.
In developed countries the most competitive knowledge regions have consolidated their
competitive advantages and lead the process of innovation. They are clearly the
engines of their respective economies and the key competitors in the global market. In
the US the San José-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara region, which includes Silicon Valley, is for
some time the leading region supported in very high rates of investment in education
and R&D (such as NASA) with a strong basis in knowledge–intensive sectors in
particular the IT, high-tech services and instrumentation and electrical machinery
sectors. The top US knowledge regions group include also Boston-Cambridge endowed
8
Robert Huggins, Hiro Izushi, Will Davies and Luo Shougui (2008). World Knowledge Competitiveness
Index 2008, Centre for International Competitiveness, Cardiff School of Management, University of Wales
Institute, UK.
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with a high quality terciary education sector with 8 strong research universities in
particular Harvard and the MIT; San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont; Hartford and Seattle-
Tacoma-Bellevue.
In Europe the strongest knowledge region is Stockholm (Sweden) which ranks 6 in the
ranking of the world knowledge competitiveness index. It has a highly educated
population - 39% has terciary education and 45% secondary education – and a
diversified economic structure although with a particular specialisation in knowledge-
intensive services and in some high-tech industrial activity: Information
Technologies/Electronics; Software/Internet; Health and Biotechnology; Transport and
Logistics.
Other leading knowledge regions in Europe include West, South and Ostra
Mellansverige in Sweden; West, East, North and South regions in the Netherlands;
Pohjois-Suomi, Etela-Suomi and Lansi-Suomi in Finland; Ile de France (Paris region)
and Centre-Est in France; Luxembourg; Denmark; Norway; Badden-Wurttemberg ,
Bayern, Hamburg and Bremen in Germany; Eastern, South East and South West in the
UK; North West and Lombardia in Italy; Noroeste/Catalunya and Madrid in Spain.
In Japan knowledge regions have also improved their performance in recent years.
Tokyo is the leading Japanese region (ranks 9 in the 2008 WKCI), possessing a strong
high-tech services sector and high rates of patents, followed by Shiga, strong in specific
knowledge sectors instrumentation and electric engineering and IT and computer
manufacturing, Kanagawa, Toyama, Osaka and Tochigi regions.
While the role of these knowledge regions in securing the leadership of advanced
economies in the innovation process is well known, the role new knowledge regions
have been playing in developing economies that have emerged recently as economic
powers is often overlooked and less known. The main argument is that one of the key
factors behind the success of the new emerging economic powers, in particular China,
Brazil and India, is the gradual consolidation of knowledge regions inside these
countries which have performed the roles of the main engines of economic growth,
centres of innovation and the fundamental bridges to the global economy. The other
side of the coin has been the asymmetric nature of their development processes.
In China, there are three crucial knowledge regions with different profiles: the “Bohai
Rim region” (Beijing, Tianjin, parts of Shandong and Liaoning); the “Yangtze River
Delta” with the leading centre in Shanghai and involving also 7 cities in Zhejiang and 8
cities in Jiangsu provinces; the “Pearl River Delta”, involving Guangdong province and
the ties with Hong Kong and Macao. The 9 coastal provinces involved in these 3 leading
poles of the Chinese economy account for nearly 2/3 of China’s GDP (62%) and GDP
per capita is 1.7 times higher than the national average; more than 75% of China
exports. It is important to note that each region has its own development model and its
specific strong points
9
.
The B
ohai Rim region has been characterized as a government driven model with the
most intensive R&D facilities (42 of the 91 institutes of the Chinese Academy of Science
9
See Robert Huggins, Hiro Izushi, Will Davies and Luo Shougui, World
Knowledge Competitiveness Index
2008, Centre for International Competitiveness, Cardiff School of Management, University of Wales
Institute, UK: 34-46; On PRD and YRD comparative analysis see Chen Xiangming (2006). Regionalizing
the Global – local Economic Nexus: a tale of two regions in China. Great Cities Institute, Working Paper,
University of Illianois Chicago, March.
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Miguel Santos Neves
19
are located here) as well as the top universities (Tsinghua University and Peking
University) and nearly 25% of university students and 30% of R&D researchers are
located in the region which accounts for 34% of national R&D expenditure. This is
mainly explained by intensive investment by the Chinese government in the last two
decades.
In contrast the Yangtze River Delta is labelled as a city-network driven model by which
the new knowledge and technology absorbed by Shanghai from its own industrial
dynamism and strong presence of foreign multinationals is then diffused from Shanghai
to smaller cities around it, in particular Nanjing, Suzhou and Hangzhou where specific
clusters are maturing. It has strong knowledge intensive sectors in particular the
automobile industry, the IT sector and chemicals and machinery as well as more dense
knowledge networks in particular strong ties between firms and universities and high
levels of technological commercialization.
Finally, the Pearl River Delta region is qualified as a FDI drive
n model as it has been an
important recipient of foreign investment accounting for 20% of FDI stock in China,
especially from and through Hong Kong, and the main basis of China exports as the
region is the origin of nearly 1/3 of Chinese exports although the share has declined in
recent years. Although the science and technology basis, the education indicators and
the density of knowledge workers are not strong points, the region benefits from the
intensive presence of foreign investors which are associated with some knowledge
transfer through workers and managers, the formation of local SMEs clusters and the
proximity of an international centre like Hong Kong with knowledge-intensive services.
In India three main knowledge regions are behind the emergence of India as a global
economic power : (i) Mumbai, capital of the state of Maharashtra, is the financial
capital of India and a region with strong knowledge intensive sectors - IT, Health sector
and audiovisual namely the film industry of Bollywood – responsible for 40% of India
exports; (ii) Hyderabad, capital of the state of Andhra Pradesh with a series of relevant
sectors IT, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and high-tech services sectors, is a main
exporter of software products ; (iii) Bangalore, capital of the state of Karnataka, is
known as the Indian Silicon Valley reflecting the fact it is the leading IT sector
producer and exporter in India accounting for 34% of India total exports
10
of IT
produ
cts, and is also an important biotechnology centre.
In Brazil the leading knowledge region is the state of São Paulo which has set up
several knowledge networks associated with the programme “Arranjos Produtivos
Locais” which involves SMEs, universities, research centres, local governments aimed at
building strong ties between the different players and fostering innovation
11
. The state
is already the powerhouse of the Brazilian economy accounting for 34% of total GDP in
2007
12
(down from 37% in 1995) and for 43% of Brazil’s industrial output and
possesses a group of knowledge-intensive sectors namely chemical industry,
machinery, medical instruments, auto industry, biotechnology, pharmaceutical, IT and
nanotechnology sectors.
10
See Invest in India “17 billion software exports for India’s IT state, http:
//investmoneyinindia.com
(2.08.10)
11
Secretaria do Desenvolvimento, Governo de São Paulo, www.desenvolvimento.sp.gov.br/drt/apls
(2.08.2010)
12
Fundação Sistema Estadual Análise de Dados e IBGE, www.seade.gov.br (2.08.2010)
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One of the important characteristics of knowledge regions is their increasing direct
participation in the international system and their ability to act more or less
autonomously in the international stage and develop paradiplomacy actions that can be
parallel or complementary to actions developed by national governments.
Paradiplomacy and foreign policy in the knowledge era
A crucial issue in terms of prospective analysis is the implications of the new knowledge
socie
ty paradigm for structural changes in foreign policy taking the emergence of
knowledge regions into account. There are interesting developments which suggest
potential fundamental changes to the goals, nature and instruments of foreign policy in
a global knowledge society.
The first development is the new relevance of paradiplomacy developed by sub-national
governments, in particular by the governments of knowledge regions. These are
increasingly active in the international arena, mainly in areas of low politics (trade,
investment, science and technology, culture, and education), trying to project their
specific interests according to a dual logic: on the one hand, a process “from the inside
out” reflecting the fact that local governments go out to promote local interests and
reduce the risks of international threats; on the other, a process “from the outside in”
whereby non-central governments become the focus of attention and suffer pressures
from both foreign governments and non-state actors as they realise that influence at
the central level is no longer sufficient to pursue their aims. This is a potential area of
conflict with the traditional diplomacy of central governments
13
.
The development of paradiplomacy is a growing trend in the international system
clearly illustrated by the old and more developed knowledge regions as well as by the
new ones in the emerging countries. Paradiplomacy first entered the international
system through the British Dominions (Canada, South Africa, Australia) in the context
of the British Empire in the 1920s. For the first time the international activity of non-
sovereign governments, although seen as a deviant behaviour, was tolerated by the
international community and the Dominions gained autonomy in negotiating
international trade agreements and other economic matters. This set a precedent. Hong
Kong was later on one of the pioneers of modern paradiplomacy as a result of a
structural conflict of interests between the colonial power, Britain, and the colony on
trade matters leading London to informally accept since the late 1950s Hong Kong´s
autonomy and capacity to negotiate directly trade agreements with foreign states. The
Hong Kong SAR still has an active paradiplomacy based on the action of the network of
HK Trade Offices (Geneva, Brussels, Washington, San Francisco, New York, Toronto,
Tokyo, Sydney, Singapore, London) at the bilateral level and HK`s participation in
multilateral organisations, particularly in WTO. The Canadian Province of Quebec was
another case in point since the early 60s when it developed close ties and signed
bilateral agreements directly with France on cultural matters which generated conflicts
with the Federal government.
13
Brian Hocking (1993). Localizing foreign policy – non-central governments and multilayered diplomacy,
London, St. Martin’s Press.
Michelmann in Hans Michelmann, and Soldatos (ed) Federalism and international relations – the role of
subnational units, Clarendon Press, 1990. Duchacek, uses the word paradiplomacy in “Perforated
sovereignties: towards a typology of new actors in international relations” in Michelmann (ed.) Federalism
and International Relations: 1-33.
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Since the late 1980s, also facilitated by the strategic decompression after the end of
the Cold War, the expansion of the paradiplomacy of sub-national governments has
been a silent but fundamental change in the international system and the way in which
states act internationally. The most developed regions became proactive in the
international stage, mainly motivated by economic reasons, as illustrated by various
cases. The German Lander such as Badden-Wurttemberg and Bavaria developed a
certain degree of external autonomy, establishing networks of external representation
offices in several countries in all continents. Bavaria for example has built since the
mid-1990s a network of external representations in 22 countries in Asia (China, India,
Japan, Vietnam), Africa (South Africa), America (Brazil, Mexico, Canada, USA New York
and USA San Francisco) and in several European countries. Interesting enough some of
these offices are located in other knowledge regions such as Guangdong the Pearl River
Delta and Shandong in China, Bangalore in India, São Paulo in Brazil and Tokyo in
Japan
14
.
In th
e context of the US states, California, the powerhouse of US knowledge economy,
has been one of the most proactive through the activity of Governors and of the
California Technology, Trade and Commerce Agency and its network of trade offices
abroad (Tokyo, London, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Mexico City, Shanghai, Taipei,
Johannesburg, Seoul, Singapore) until 2003 when the agency was dismantled. But
many other States such as Florida, New York, Nebraska, North Dakota, Kentucky or
Colorado have followed the same path and are also active internationally, under the
leadership of their Governors who perform the role of economic ambassadors seeking
to promote the competitiveness of their States in the global economy and to boost their
own political profile
15
.
Another interesting example is Catalunya which enjoys a high degree of autonomy in
domestic affairs and has developed since the late 1980s a very active paradiplomacy
that promotes its specific economic and cultural interests in the international arena
through the activities of the network of external offices managed by COPCA (Consorci
de Promoció Comercial de Catalunya) participated by the Catalunya Government,
Chambers of Commerce, industry sectoral associations and export associations. These
entities jointly created and manage the network of 35 external trade offices located in
31 countries and covering 70 countries around the world
16
, including China (Beijing,
Shang
hai), India (New Dehli), Hong Kong, Singapore, Brazil (São Paulo) or the USA
(Washington, New York, Los Angeles) at the same time it directly supports firms at
home through training and assistance for the development of their international/export
departments. Moreover, bilateral relations with States and other Non-Central
Governments are one of the priorities leading to the signature of international
agreements in a variety of areas ranging from trade, investment, education, culture,
science and technology or health.
14
See Invest in Bavaria, State Agency (http://www.invest-in-bavaria.de/en/bavarias-foreign-
representations/)
15
A good example of this “profile-boosting strategy” has been California’s Governor Schwarzenegger
signa
ture of an agreement on climate change with British Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2006. On US states’
paradiplomacy see McMillan, Samuel Lucas (2008). “Subnational Foreign Policy Actors: How and Why
Governors participate in US Foreign Policy” in Foreign Policy Analysis, 4, 227-253. For example,
California’s Governor Gray Davis created a secretary of foreign affairs and hosted political leaders from
China, Japan and Singapore. In 2001 alone California hosted foreign dignitaries from 67 countries.
16
See Generalitat Catalunya, COPCA (http:
//www.acc10.cat/ACC10/cat) acceded 3.08.2010
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22
In the case of China the development of the paradiplomacy of the leading Chinese
provinces since the mid-1990s although discrete and with little visibility, has been a
major factor to explain China’s integration in the global economy and her impressive
emergence as a global economic power. Indeed one of the key institutional ingredients
of China’s economic success has been the high level of decentralisation of economic
decision-making from central government to provincial governments and even to local
governments, including in foreign trade and attraction of FDI, since the early stage of
reforms. The paradiplomacy of the most developed coastal Chinese provinces, an
extension of this internal autonomy, was further developed as a consequence of the
implementation of the “Go Global” strategy implemented since 2000 and has gradually
been blessed by the Central Government, encouraged by the positive experience with
Hong Kong’s external autonomy since 1997. Beijing saw this paradiplomacy as useful
and complementary insofar it could function as a mechanism to explore more informal
channels with economic partners and nurture special relationships; mobilize the
overseas Chinese business communities; and even as a solution to manage economic
relations with countries which have no diplomatic relations with the PRC.
Guangdong Province has been probably the pioneer and developed since the mid-
1990s, under the coordination of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Guangdong Provincial
Government, special relations with some “sister provinces” in various continents. As far
as Europe is concerned Guangdong developed paradiplomacy relations with 7 European
Provinces/Regions: Utrecht (2002), with initiatives in the areas of environmental
protection, agriculture, and trade; Skane (Sweden) 1997, especially exchanges in
education, environment and medicare; Alpes Cote d’Azur (2000); Catalonia (2003);
Fyn Region (Denmark) 2004; State of Bavaria (2004). This special relationship involved
the organisation of trade missions, the creation of permanent trade and investment
offices such as the offices opened by Catalonia and Utrecht (jointly set up with Dutch
Chamber of Commerce the Holland House in Guangzhou), the organisation of
investment promotion seminars, participation in trade fairs etc.
There are also more recent but interesting examples of other provinces belonging to
the other growth pole of the Chinese economy, the Yangtze River Delta which have
invested in building preferential ties with specific European regions. In the case of
Jiangsu, the Provincial Government opened 5 Economic and Trade Offices in Europe
with the headquarters located in Dusseldorf in 1996 followed by the offices in Paris,
Chelmsford - Essex County and East England (UK), Tilburg – Province of Noord-Brabant
(Netherlands) and Stockholm (Sweden)
17
. Specific European regions have also
estab
lished their own trade offices in Nanjing, capital of Jiangsu, like Essex County, the
German Landers of Nordrhein Westfalen and Baden-Wurttemberg, through Baden-
Wurttemberg International
18
, or the Paris Department of Haute Seine. For obvious
reasons Shanghai is an important location of trade and investment offices from the
paradiplomacy of EU regions having developed special relations with Barcelona, Milan,
Rotterdam, Hamburg, Liverpool, Marseille, Antwerp.
17
The intensity of paradiplomacy initiatives is rapidly increasing. For example the Giangsu Provincial
Depar
tment of Trade and Economic Cooperation organized several investment seminars in France, Italy,
Germany, Belgium and Britain between 21-31 May 2007, involving more than 100 entrepreneurs from
Jiangsu. This initiative alone led to the signature of investment contracts worth US$ 1.3 billion and import
and export contracts of more than US$ 100 million (see http://www.china-jiangsu.org/news.htm
).
18
Illustrating this increasingly closer relationship between the two regions, Baden-Wurttemberg and
Shanghai created a joint portal in the Internet (http://www.bw.shanghai.de/portal.jsp).
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Another case in point is the special relationship between the Lander of Bavaria and
Shandong Province which developed special ties in terms of mutual investment
promotion, but also cultural exchanges and even swap and training of civil servants.
Bavaria has created the State of Bavaria Shandong Office in 1997 and in September
2006 the Shandong Provincial Government opened in Munich the Business
Representative Office of Shandong with the blessing of China’s Central Government.
However, it should be stressed that this paradiplomacy does not concern exclusively
the Provincial level, there are also paradiplomacy initiatives at the municipal and county
levels contributing to a much more complex picture, especially because a minimum
level of coordination that exists between Central and Provincial Governments is much
more difficult to ensure in relation to lower levels of government.
In the case of Brazil the paradiplomacy of the Brazilian States, called “federated
diplomacy”, is a recent phenomenon pioneered by the States of Rio de Janeiro and Rio
Grande do Sul in the late 1980s followed by São Paulo, Paraná, Baía or even other
states involved mainly in transborder paradiplomacy with neighbouring states –
Roraima, Acre, Amazonas e Amapá
19
. The Federal State has recognised and to some
exten
t favoured the increasing international proactivity of sub-national governments
and tried to set up a coordination mechanism in 1997, the “Assessoria de Relações
Federativas” between the Itamaraty and the state and municipal governments in order
to ensure there was no major contradictions between national foreign policy and
paradiplomacy initiatives
20
. In addition the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has created 8
representation offices in various states and regions to operationalise the process which
constitutes an innovative solution. This can be seen as an act of legitimisation of
paradiplomacy by the central government. The most recent trend has been the
intensification of paradiplomacy relations, anchored in bilateral agreement, between
Brazilian States and Chinese Provinces: São Paulo-Shanghai, Baía-Shandong, Pará-
Sichuan, Paraná-Hainan, Mato Grosso-Jiangxi.
Looking at these different experiences it is possible to point out some conclusions
concerning the nature, dynamics and impact of paradiplomacy at present.
First, it should be stressed that paradiplomacy is not an homogeneous phenomenon on
the contrary has a heterogeneous nature. On the one hand this is the result of the
coexistence of different types of paradiplomacy as argued by Duchacek identifying
three different types of paradiplomacy according to its contents and regional scope: (i)
transborder regional diplomacy (or micro-regional), referring to transborder relations
between geographically contiguous NCGs which was initially the dominant form (ii)
transregional paradiplomacy (or macro-regional) between NCGs which are not
contiguous and (iii) global paradiplomacy, involving distant players, including sovereign
states and touching all issues in the international system, including security,
international trade etc
21
. I would argue that another type of paradiplomacy should be
19
See Francisco Gomes Filho and Alcides Costa Vaz (2008). “Paradiplomacia no contexto da Amazonia
brasileira – estratégias de desenvolvimento regional do Estado de Roraima”. In Ci & Desenvolvimento,
Belém, vol. 4, nº 7, jul-dez 2008: 155-165.
20
See Decree 2.246/1997 República Federativa do Brazil; On Brazil’s paradiplomacy see Gilberto Rodrigues
(2006
), "Política Externa Federativa. Análise de Ações Internacionais de Estados e Municípios Brasileiros".
CEBRI Tese, Rio de Janeiro, CEBRI.
21
See Michelmann in Hans Michelmann, and Soldatos (1990) (ed), Feder
alism and international relations –
the role of subnational units, Clarendon Press: 299-312 and Duchacek, “Perforated sovereignties: towards
a typology of new actors in international relations” in Michelmann (ed.) Federalism and International
Relations: 1-33.
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identified “multilateral paradiplomacy” that refers to the participation of some sub-
national governments in multilateral organisations and the production of multilateral
rules being the best example Hong Kong. These different types of paradiplomacy have
different impacts both on the international system and national foreign policy. Whereas
transborder regional paradiplomacy does not raise much controversy and is accepted
and even promoted by central governments, transregional and, above all, global
paradiplomacy is more likely to raise tensions and tend to be regarded with suspicion
by central governments. In addition the more we move towards complex and
demanding global paradiplomacy or multilateral paradiplomacy more robust
institutional and financial capacity is required.
On the other hand, I would argue that a major distinction must be drawn between a
permanent and structured modality of paradiplomacy, mainly developed by the richest
knowledge regions, developed according to a long term strategy, and sporadic and non-
structured paradiplomacy activities involving the use of specific instruments for short-
term purposes. There is an important qualitative difference between these two
modalities which has to be acknowledged with clear implications for the density of the
international status of sub-national governments.
Second, concerning the conditions of success, in spite of the diffusion and explosion of
paradiplomacy, the practice of a robust, effective and consistent paradiplomacy is still
strongly associated with, and somehow restricted to rich and powerful knowledge
regions operating within States, federal or unitary, possessing a considerable level of
decentralisation. These are the sub-national governments that have the financial
means, the human resources, institutional capabilities and the level of domestic
autonomy to engage in complex international relations. In this context it should be
stressed that domestic autonomy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. The
degree and dynamics of substantive external autonomy is fundamentally determined by
the complex interplay between three different factors: SNG own institutional capacity
and strategy to act internationally; the pattern of relations with the Central
Government and the mechanisms and level of control exerted by the former; the
attitude and recognition of external players and willingness to interact on the
international stage. In short, there are different conditions of success that interact
which include not only institutional conditions related to level of decentralisation and
economic conditions concerning the resources and strengths of regions, but also
political conditions, related to the attitude of central governments, and regional
leadership conditions
22
.
Third
, the concerns over the dysfunctional nature of paradiplomacy and the risks of
conflicts between central governments and sub-national governments expressed in the
1990s by authors like Soldatos, are no longer justified. This “chaos scenario,” heavily
influenced by the state-centric view, considered paradiplomacy to be a dangerous
derogation of state power and a clear threat to the coherence and unity of foreign
policy: sub-national actors were regarded as trespassers and their behaviour as
deviant. A major shift in perception has occurred. In fact as a result of accumulated
experience, and leaving aside the few exceptions where sub-national governments had
separatist agendas, paradiplomacy is by and large seen as beneficial and a positive
22
These factors have been highlighted by Keating, M. (2000). Paradiplomacy and Regional Networking,
paper presented at the Forum of Federations: an International Federalism
(http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs).
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contribution to strengthen the overall international position of states, strongly
illustrated by the Chinese, Brazilian and Spanish cases, and less and less perceived as a
deviant behaviour. In other words it can be argued that paradiplomacy is no longer
seen as an anomaly but on the contrary as a normal and increasingly diffused practice
which central governments have even encouraged and ought to incorporate in their
foreign policy planning
23
.
Fourth, traditional analysis tend to see paradiplomacy as a consequence of globalization
and the need local/regional communities have to respond to new challenges and
increasing uncertainty in order to pursue their specific economic interests in the global
market, to project their cultural identity and to overcome the limitations and rigidities
of traditional central bureaucracies that are slow to adjust to new conditions. However,
it seems more accurate to consider that paradiplomacy is simultaneously a
consequence of glocalisation and a cause, a catalyst of glocalisation. Knowledge
networks are behind the development of paradiplomacy through regional governments.
Building on the fact they are leading poles of innovation, networks aim at enhancing
their competitive position in the global market but also to link up and cooperate with
other knowledge networks abroad. This means that paradiplomacy is not a passive and
defensive response to globalization, on the contrary it is indeed part and parcel of the
process of globalization, it contributes to greater integration in the global market and is
the expression of the multi-level governance paradigm.
Fifth, paradiplomacy is a fundamental source of innovation in foreign policy insofar it
incorporates and anticipates some of the changes in the conception and rationale of
States’ foreign policy that will be brought about by the new knowledge
society/economy paradigm. To start with the abolition of the boundaries between the
domestic and the external levels, there is clearly a continuum, external action is just
the extension of domestic network activity and should involve the same players. This
also implies a more holistic approach and greater coherence and coordination between
domestic policies and foreign policy as well as greater transparency and citizen
participation. Moreover, it shows that external action will be more and more a multi-
actor, multidimensional process where public, private and third sector actors have to
engage and combine their different skills in the context of long term partnerships.
Knowledge networks involving coordination and cooperation between governments,
business, NGOs, academia, trade unions becomes paramount for effective external
action not only in terms of implementation but also in terms of policy conception.
Furthermore, paradiplomacy highlights the growing importance of informal channels
and procedures and the role of Soft Law in the regulation of the international system
which ensures flexibility and adaptability to adjust to uncertainty and rapid change.
Finally, new global issues involve increasingly technical and complex issues requiring
expertise which governments lack therefore requiring the active involvement and
contribution of private firms, universities, research institutions. In this respect it is
relevant to highlight the new role of global transnational networks in international rule-
23
In the same line Michael Keating (2000). Parad
iplomacy and Regional Networking, paper presented at the
Forum of Federations: an International Federalism (http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs). Andrew Petter
referring to the Canadian experience clearly states that “…Canadian Governments have facilitated and
encouraged paradiplomacy over the years as a means of accommodating nationalist sentiments, regional
interests and economic pressures” – see Canadian Paradiplomacy in practice: confessions of a
paradiplomat, paper presented to the Conference The International Relations of the Regions: sub-national
actors, para-diplomacy and multi-level Governance, Zaragoza, 2006 (mimeo).
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creation, and renewed concern with global rule-implementation, which pressuposes the
active involvement of sub-national actors and knowledge regions insofar as they can
adapt global rules to local specificities.
Sixth, paradiplomacy is a strategic channel for the creation and consolidation of the
“soft power”
24
of States not only because of the informal channels and instruments it
uses but also because of the fundamental relevance of the issue-areas addressed by
paradiplomacy, namely trade, investment and economic cooperation; education and
human capital; migrations; science and technology; culture and identity. All of these
are crucial dimensions of “soft power” and this is the main reason behind the open-
minded and tolerant attitude of China’s Central Government with regard to some
Chinese Provinces’ paradiplomacy the more so as this was combined with the Chinese
Diaspora strategy, another crucial instrument of China’s soft power. Dense and robust
knowledge regions, internationally proactive are the main builders of soft power in the
context of glocalisation.
However, despite internationally proactive knowledge regions are a fundamental tool to
sustain systemic competitiveness in the global economy and consolidate soft power,
this is a phenomenon that involves a limited number of states. Still, the majority of
states are excluded from this trend as they have been slow to adapt to the new
paradigm, both in terms of changes in governance models and policies, and failed to
create the necessary conditions to facilitate the emergence of knowledge regions. On
the contrary, they tend to hold on to very centralized systems believing that only a
strong centre can respond to the new threats and face the challenges of glocalisation.
A good example is the case of Portugal where a historical centralist tradition has been
somehow reinforced by the dynamics of the EU integration process. As a result Portugal
is today one of the most centralised states in Europe a major factor preventing the
emergence of dynamic regions.
Portugal went through a vivid debate on regionalisation and decentralisation in the late
1990s as a consequence of the process of referendum on regionalisation held in 1998
which culminated in the rejection of the proposal to create 8 administrative regions
along the lines foreseen in the law
25
. The creation of administrative regions was a
bindi
ng principle already enshrined in the 1976 Constitution but never implemented. In
spite of possessing since 1976 two autonomous regions, Madeira and Azores, the
continental part of the Portuguese territory has been managed under a fairly
centralised system making Portugal one of the most centralised states in Europe
26
.
The terms of the debate in 1998 analysed in more detail elsewhere
27
and the
arguments put forward revolved around the implications of regionalisation for the
reform of public administration, national cohesion and the impact on development
24
In the sense used by Joseph Nye (2004). Soft Power: the means to success in world politics, Public
Affairs.
25
Law 19/98 which defined 8 regions: Entre Douro e Minho; Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro; Beira Litoral;
Beira Interior; Estremadura e Ribatejo; Lisboa e Setúbal; Alentejo; Algarve.
26
See Hahan J.P. and Loo, M.V. (1999). A Seminar Game to Analyze Regional Governance in Portugal,
Lisboa, FLAD e Rand Corporation. The level of centralisation can be measured by the share of tax revenue
controlled by the Central Government which reached 93% in Portugal (Central government+social
security) which means that the share of local governments in total tax revenue was 6.2% in 2005, the
same as in 1998 see OECD Revenue Statistics 1965-2006, 2007, Paris ; OECD Tax and the Economy –
comparative assessment of OECD countries 2001
27
See André Freire and Michael Baum (2001). “O referendo Português sobre a Regionalização numa
persp
ectiva comparada” in Penélope, nº 24: 147-178.
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27
asymmetries between regions, the organisation and coordination between municipal
governments and the risks of corruption, nepotism and intensification of political
clientelism. In short, regionalisation was then seen strictly as a domestic issue and
analysed in the same logic prevailing in the 1970s when the issue was first raised, as if
the world had not changed, and taking no account of the experiences and results of
other EU countries. Surprisingly there was no reflection on the dynamics and challenges
of the knowledge society/economy and its implications for governance.
In the last decade the debate on regionalisation has been frozen and no real advances
were made in terms of promoting descentralisation. The opportunity costs of no-
regionalisation have been considerable if we look at Portugal’s fragile capacity to
respond to the challenges of globalization and the transition to the knowledge society.
Regionalisation should not be approached from a restrictive and outdated domestic
perspective but from a wider perspective as part and parcel of Portugal’s strategy to
deal with globalization and enhance its competitiveness in the global economy. It
should be stressed that competitiveness is a systemic process and so the
competitiveness of the Portuguese economy can not be confused with the
competitiveness of a few Portuguese large firms. As long as the core nucleus of the
Portuguese productive system, the SMEs, is not involved the sustained competitiveness
of the Portuguese economy is at risk.
The inexistence of knowledge regions in Portugal is the main cost of no-regionalisation
and a major impediment for Portugal’s capacity to foster the process of innovation and
compete in the global market. As argued earlier, the regional level is the optimal level
for the creation of knowledge networks that produce and diffuse tacit knowledge.
Although regionalisation is not a sufficient condition, it is certainly a necessary
institutional and political condition for the emergence of knowledge regions. In addition,
it provides interesting opportunities for the development of paradiplomacy in Portugal,
an important tool to complement traditional foreign policy and to explore new channels
and opportunities in an increasingly complex international system. The potential
contributions of the paradiplomacy of future regions are varied but I would stress the
capacity to: facilitate the redefinition of relations with the Spanish Autonomous
Communities and support a more proactive strategy towards them; explore new ties
with other European regions; respond positively to the paradiplomacy initiatives
developed by Chinese Provinces or Brazilian and Indian States; link up with the
Portuguese diaspora and integrate it as strategic players and a major asset in the
globalized world.
Conclusions
Knowledge regions are strategic leading players in the process of transition to the
knowl
edge society/economy and the main competitors in the global economy. If it is
true that they allowed advanced economies to retain control over the innovation
process and therefore preserve the leadership in the world economy, it is also true that
knowledge regions are a key factor behind the rise of the new emerging economic
powers, namely China, Brazil and India, which challenge the dominance of the US, EU
and Japan. Knowledge regions became also new actors in the international system, still
with an informal and fluid status, as their governments are increasingly active
internationally through organized and permanent paradiplomacy actions and structures.
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This external dimension of knowledge regions, in general overlooked, is a fundamental
ingredient of their success and capacity to pursue their specific economic, political,
scientific or cultural interests and project their identity.
Paradiplomacy practised on a permanent and structured basis by sub-national
governments of the most advanced knowledge regions, or on sporadic and non-
structured basis by other regions, is mainly focused on low politics areas, ranging from
trade and investment, to science and technology, education, culture issues and involves
the use of both formal instruments, such as international agreements or trade offices,
and informal instruments. Far from being marginal areas, these are on the contrary
crucial issues for the building of knowledge society and for strengthening the soft power
of states. One of the key arguments put forward is that paradiplomacy is a strategic
channel for the creation and consolidation of soft power, the capacity to influence
others and shape their behaviour by persuasion and attraction rather than coercion.
The knowledge society and the logic of knowledge networks have important
consequences in terms of changes in foreign policy and the way in which states interact
with each other and with non-state actors. In this respect it is argued paradiplomacy is
an important source of innovation and somehow anticipates some of the inevitable
changes to come in central governments’ external action, namely the abolition of
boundaries between the domestic and the international levels, requiring an integrated
approach and greater coherence and coordination between domestic policies and
foreign policy; the implementation of a multi-actor process highly participated both in
terms of formulation and implementation which is the effective way to respond to the
increasing complexity of both the issues-areas and the international community; the
increasing relevance of informal channels and the role of Soft Law and transnational
networks in international regulation.
Contrary to concerns expressed over the risks of conflicts between central and sub-
national governments and threats to the unity of state foreign policy, experience
demonstrates that paradiplomacy is a positive factor and contributes to strengthen, not
weaken, the international position of states and overcome some of its vulnerabilities, in
particular to expand the soft power of states. As a consequence paradiplomacy ceased
to be seen as unorthodox and marginal and tends to be gradually perceived as a
normal activity with a fundamental strategic importance insofar knowledge regions are
clearly the best positioned brokers between the global and the local, with a crucial role
to play in the improvement of Global Governance, both in rule-setting and rule-
implementation, and the operation of the multi-level governance system.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 1, n.º 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 29-44
SECURITY AND SECURITY COMPLEX: OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
Luís Tomé
Professor at Univers
idade Autónoma de Lisboa (UAL). Visiting Professor at the Portuguese War
College (IESM) and the Instituto de Defesa Nacional (IDN).
Scientific Coordinator of OBSERVARE and Deputy Director of JANUS.NET
PhD in International Relations by Coimbra’s University
Abstract
Security is one of the most ambiguous, contested, and debated ideas in the conceptual
framework of international relations. The "traditional" perspective has been severely
contested as new approaches develop, and the concept of security has been reworked in all
its fundamental components and dimensions, from object and reference to range and
security instruments. Likewise, the discussion over the definition and characterization of
international security systems, namely regarding competitive security, common security,
cooperative security, collective security, and security community, continues to be very
lively. Starting from these debates, and in the light of the current international situation, we
propose operational concepts of security and of security complex.
Keywords
Security; Security Complex; International Relations; Theory
; Concepts
How to cite this article
Tomé, Luís (2010) "Security and security complex: operational concepts". JANUS.NET e-
journal of International Relations, N.º 1, Autumn 2010. Consulted [online] on date of the
last visit, observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol1_n1_art3
Article received in August 2010 and accepted for publication in August 2010
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 1, n.º 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 29-44
Security and security complex: operational concepts
Luís Tomé
30
SECURITY AND SECURITY COMPLEX: OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
Luís Tomé
Security continues to be a top concern, a major issue of debate in national, regional,
and g
lobal agendas. Likewise, it continues to require major resources and the sacrifice
of many lives. However, as societies and international relations change, the approach
to security also evolves. For that reason, security continues to be the focus of
discussion, and to be redesigned in all its components and major dimensions, from its
reference to international security systems. Starting from these debates, and in the
light of the current international situation, what we propose in this paper are
operational concepts of security and of security complex.
1. From "traditional security" to “new approaches"
A significant part of debates over security concerns the object it refers to and the range
it co
vers: What is the object of security and what entity must be protected (whose
security)? What are the nature and type of threats, risks, and challenges (security in
face of whom, or what)? What is the agent of security (security by whom) and with
what means (security instruments)? The respective concepts of security depend on how
one answers these questions.
In the realist perspective,
1
according to which the international system is anarchical
and in a permanent state of competition and conflict, the State is not only the major
agent, but also the almost exclusive reference of security. In other words, it means
security by the State and for the State. In this light, the concepts of security focused,
for quite some time, around topics that James Wirtz (2007: 338) describes as high
politics: war and peace, diplomatic summits, nuclear dissuasion, weapons control,
military alliances, defence of "national interests" or, in other words, “national security”
and “international security” always perceived from the exclusive stance of the State. In
contrast, the topics of low politics (environment, energy, migratory flows,
overpopulation, health, underdevelopment, etc.), despite being regarded as sources of
problems, were seldom perceived as risks or threats to national or international
security.
1
Whenever, in this paper, we make reference to concept/approach/school/paradigm/ perspective/"realist"
vision, we consider its essence or fundamental and defining traits, without tending to the great diversity
and wealth of analysis it entails.
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On the other hand, security was always associated with the military dimension, often to
the exclusion of all others. There are even some authors who, like Richard Ullman, have
reversed their position, after initially advocating a more inclusive perspective. He, who
early on stated that "defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military
terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality [which] is doubly misleading and
therefore doubly dangerous" (Ullman, 1983: 129), later defended that "if national
security encompasses all serious and urgent threats to a nation-state and its citizens,
we will eventually find ourselves using a different term when we wish to make clear
that our subject is the threats that might be posed by the military force of other states.
The “war problem” is conceptually distinct from, say, problems like environmental
degradation or urban violence, which are better characterized as threats to well-being
(…) Labeling a set of circumstances as a problem of national security when it has no
likelihood of involving as part of the solution a state’s organs of violence accomplishes
nothing except obfuscation» (Ullman, 1995: 3-12). In fact, for a certain school of
thought, the relationship between security and the non-military dimensions is only
relevant when such elements are at the root of international conflict or have an impact
on war.
The traditional approach to security highly centred on the State, on the topics of high
politics and on the military instrument, has been severely contested. From the start,
the incapacity of the State in face of pressures it encounters "from above", "from
below", and "from within" (Tomé, 2003; 2004), becomes an issue. Other opinions,
which João Gomes Cravinho (2006: 256) portrays as "hyperglobalistic", suggest that
the State is about to become irrelevant as a deciding entity or, simply, that it no longer
is an adequate structure to deal with the challenges facing Humanity.
Similarly, many believe that it is inadequate to apply conventional logic of "state
security" to non-consolidated state entities, or in cases when the "State” itself is
perceived as the main source of insecurity for its people. In fact, in many instances, the
internal environment is far more unstable, or Hobbesian, than the international one,
reducing some States to the condition of "non-States": the notions of "Failed State”,
“Fragile State” and “State in Collapse" describe that type of situation.
This implies, naturally, a substantive alteration of the reference of security: «When
human rights and the environment are protected, the lives and identities of people tend
to be safe; when they are not protected, people are not safe, independently of the
military capability of the State where they live» (Klare & Thomas 1994: 3-4). Thus, the
State is no longer viewed as the only or even the major reference of security, and the
security of individuals and communities gain relevance. Ken Booth (1991) - who calls
himself an ex-realist, anti-realist, and post-realist and advocates an "utopian realism" -
admits the possibility of a redesign of security around a global civil society and a
community of global communities, with both local and universal issues: that is,
“populations”, more so than States, must be the reference of security. Variations of this
perspective point to human collectivities (Buzan, 1991), society (Waever, 1997), the
community (Alagappa, 1998), individuals (Alkire, 2003) or Humanity (Commission on
Human Security) as the reference of security.
Furthermore, the traditional differentiation between “internal” and “external” security
dimensions is clearly diluted. Even authors of the "realist school", like B. Buzan (1991:
363), wisely recognize the limits of that traditional dichotomy: «Though the term
'national security' suggests an occurrence at State level, the connection between that
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level and the individual, regional, and systemic levels are too numerous and powerful
to be denied...the concept of security so strictly connects those levels and sectors that
it demands to be treated through an integrated perspective». In fact, it seems evident
that «security threats are not confined to national borders, they are interrelated and
must be dealt with at the national, intra-State, regional, and international levels»
(Tomé, 2007: 18).
On the other hand, it became clear that security, economic development, and human
freedom are inseparable. Along this line, Dietrich Fisher (1993), for example,
distinguishes between object of danger (survival, health, economic well-being, liveable
environment, and political rights), geographic source of dangers (internal, external, and
global), and human sources or natural sources of dangers (intentional threat, non-
intentional dangers of human nature, natural risks) to arrive at the conclusion that the
main non-military dangers are environmental decline, underdevelopment,
overpopulation, violation of political rights, and ideological nationalism. Likewise, B.
Buzan (1991: 19-20) highlights five domains that are intricately related: military
security, political security, economic security, societal security, and environmental
security.
Economic security was the first of those non-military domains to deserve the attention
of researchers, strategists, and politicians, in particular, following the 1973 oil crisis. In
spite of that, it was not until the end of the Cold War that the idea that the highest
stakes were moving to the economic arena gained momentum and became
generalized: in face of the increase in economic interdependence and the need to
guarantee conditions for economic development and access to supply and outflow
markets and their routes, economic and energy security became crucial dimensions of
security.
More recently, the environment has equally become associated with security. «The
process of environmental degradation», Al Gore (1990: 60) stated two decades ago,
«threatens not only the quality of life, but life itself. The global environment became,
then, a matter of national security». A sign of the times, Al Gore and the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change of the UN were awarded the Nobel Prize
for Peace, in 2007.
There are many other aspects that have been included in the security agenda, albeit
with different degrees of controversy and/or acceptance. For instance, while the
inclusion of human rights, natural disasters, and infectious diseases is relatively
controversial, terrorism is mentioned in virtually all contemporary literature on security,
as do maritime piracy, transnational organized crime, cyber attacks, and biologic,
bacteriologic, and radiological issues. No wonder, then, that Simon Dalby (2006) made
more reference to the "geopolitics of global dangers" than to the competition among
superpowers or territorial disputes, while Hartmann et al. (2005) highlighted a new
agenda for security in the "era of terror" and "bio-anxiety."
The fact is that, ever more frequently, we come across proposals that invert the
hierarchy of high and low politics and place non-conventional issues at the top of the
security agenda. This gives rise to the additional problem of militarization of non-
military dimensions of security: in other words, the securitization of certain issues
traditionally associated with low politics (that is, the discursive assumption that certain
problems threaten "national and/or international security", elevating and giving them a
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relevance never before achieved) could fuel a tendency to address and resolve them
through traditional means of high politics, giving priority to military intervention and
raising (in)security at other levels (Dannreuther, 2007: 42-44). In the same way, the
non-securitization of some "traditional" threats (discounting or downplaying their
significance) may lead to a breach between reality and the magnitude of the threat, by
underestimating it.
The enlargement of the security agenda and the multiplication of "new dimensions"
give rise to a much greater assortment in terms of security instruments, well beyond
those of military nature, ranging from help to development to new judicial and financial
regimens, from diplomacy to the advancement of human rights or the strengthening of
the Rule of Law. Besides, other than States, there are clearly many more players
involved who may either be threats (terrorist groups or criminal associations) or
promoters of security (from international organizations to NGOs).
All this means that the realistic vision and the "traditional" approach to security have
been questioned in their fundamental aspects: the State as exclusive actor and single
security reference; threats, primarily external, intentional, and military; almost
exclusive military instruments; the clear distinction between internal and external
aspects (Brandão, 1999: 173). As a result, the debate around the broadening and
deepening of the concept of security has intensified and we have witnessed its
"expansion" in four fundamental directions, as stressed by Emma Rothchild (1995:55):
"downward extension", that is, from the security of the States to that of groups and
individuals; "upward extension", from national security to security at much broader
levels, such as the environment/biosphere or Humanity; "horizontal extension",
switching from military security to political, economic, social, environmental or human
security; and "multi-directional security", from the States to the international
institutions, local and regional governments, non-governmental organizations, as well
as public opinion, the media, and abstract forces of nature or markets.
This has resulted in broader security concepts and measures, of which comprehensive
security, world/global security, and human security stand out.
The concept of comprehensive security appeared in the late 70s and early 80s, initially
developed by Japan - as part of the redesign of the "Yoshida Doctrine" and the concept
of economic security. Later, other countries and organizations, such as Canada, the
Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and even the United Nations,
adopted it. "Comprehensive security" underlines the multi-dimensional and multi-
instrumental character of security, and shifts the focus from political-military disputes
to a myriad of economic, social, and environmental concerns. At the same time, it
concentrates on non-military instruments, such as development assistance, economic
cooperation, or international institutions. Besides, according to promoters of
"comprehensive security", the recognition of multiple dimensions and the cooperative
development of multiple instruments may contribute to minimize tensions between
traditional antagonists and to increase the security of all. G. Evans (1993), however,
contends the greatest weakness in this concept is that is so inclusive and ambiguous
that it loses much of its descriptive capacity and, on the other hand, it becomes
hostage of the overestimation of international cooperation.
Other concepts that are currently gaining support include global security and world
security, both of which mean more or less the same. In its report "Our Global
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Neighbourhood" the Commission on Global Governance expressly prefers the term
"global security: «Global security must be broadened from its traditional focus on the
security of states to include the security of people and the planet» (1995, Chapt. III,
Promoting Security). Similarly, Gwyn Prins (1994: 7) supports the urgency of a "global
security" because Humanity is connected through a new "community of vulnerabilities".
Along the same lines, Seymon Brown (1994) invokes the concept of "world interests" to
reconcile national, international, and sub-national interests.
The most controversial approach, however, is that of human security. This concept
often appears associated with the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, though its
ground-concept was developed much earlier: In June of 1945, in reference to the
results of the San Francisco conference, the USA Secretary of State already reported
that «The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front
where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front
where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the
world of an enduring peace…» (cit in UNDP, 1994: 3). Therefore, the presumption of
human security is to free all Humanity from fear and violence (freedom from fear) and
poverty, and deprivation (fear from want). Accordingly, «Human security is not a
concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity» (ibid: 22).
This concept has been recurrently used, albeit with different characteristics and
definitions.
2
Its own proponents differ regarding what threa
ts, or fundamental threats,
individuals must be protected against: the more strict concept focuses on internal
violence exercised by governments or politically organized groups against communities
or individuals; a more inclusive concept, however, considers that hunger, disease, and
natural disasters must also be included. In turn, its critics point to an excessively vague
nature, its ambiguity and incoherence, and even its arbitrary nature and inadequacy.
Roland Paris (2001: 93-96) is particularly fierce in his criticism: «if human security
means almost everything, then, in effect, it means nothing (...) the ambiguity of the
term serves one particular purpose: it unites a diverse, and often divided, coalition of
States and organizations which "seek an opportunity to achieve some more substantial
political interest and greater financial means" (...) Human security does not appear to
offer a particularly useful analytical framework, either in academic or in political
terms».
Independently of this controversy, countries like Canada, Norway, or Japan
incorporated this approach in their security and foreign policies, in an attempt to
implement it. Likewise, international institutions such as the World Bank, the OECD, the
ASEAN, and the UN also adopted it as a reference to their activities. In reality, the idea
that the first goal of security is the protection of individuals and communities is enough
to cause reasonable changes: indeed, the traditional framework which explains and
tries to avoid war, or promote peace, among States is clearly insufficient and irrelevant
to deal with the new dangers and transnational concerns, violent conflicts within States,
or to protect individuals or groups from certain attacks or tragedies (Tomé, 2007: 18).
Therefore, human security is associated with controversial principles that emerged in
2
One of the most influential is that of the Commission on Human Security (2003: 4): «Human security
means protecting fundamental freedoms — freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting
people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes
that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental,
economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival,
livelihood and dignity».
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the international security panorama over the last years, such as "humanitarian
intervention" or the "Responsibility to Protect", the latter formally adopted at the UN
World Summit, in September 2005, as part of that Organization's reform.
Another perspective that has gained recognition in theoretical-conceptual debates and
political thought is the so-called critical security, which shares and impacts the vision of
human security with an anti-State and anti-realist theory. This approach is also
particularly sceptical regarding the impact of international liberalism in the security
agenda, going as far as to call it "subversive" or "subservient". Karlos Pérez de Armiño
(2009: 8), for instance, states that «it has been noticed a certain co-optation and
distortion of the concept of human security by western countries, with the purpose of
placing it at the service of their foreign policies». Additionally, José Manuel Pureza
(2009), stresses «the ambition to bring the fight against fear and deprivation into
security priorities did not result in substantial changes in international power relations,
and has served fundamentally as a point of support (one more) to the discipline of the
turbulent periphery by the restless centre». The roots of neo-Marxist tradition in the
critical theory of security are clear, but the fact is that, like all other main areas, the
field of Critical Security Studies is wide and heterogeneous, and encompasses diverse
tendencies, from Feminism, to Marxism-Leninism, and to Anarchism. The uniting factor
in such originally distinct theories is their vision and common commitment to a
«“critical” rather than a “problem-solving” approach to IR» (Danneuther, 2007: 49). In
other words, the “critical vision" seeks to differ in the way it identifies the root of
security problems, and how it proposes to substantially alter the situation it condemns.
It attempts to "undo" conventional discourses and, in some cases, "invalidate" them to
re(focus) attention on human condition and its emancipation. It employs an approach
that relegates the interests of States, of the "centre" and the “powerful”, to second
place, in favor of individuals, "peripheries", and the “underprivileged”.
2. An operational concept of Security
Clearly, Security is one of the most ambiguous, debated, and contested ideas in the
overa
ll conceptual framework of international relations. Concepts evolve with time and
change according to circumstances, which, in effect, make it imperative to redefine the
concept of security. The effort to conceptualise security and to accommodate the great
complexity and diversity of its fundamental elements with impartiality, while preserving
its analytical and operational usefulness, is a complex and delicate exercise.
Nevertheless, we attempt to do it, based on six major premises:
1) Communities are the references of security;
2) Well being and political survival, considered from a relatively broad but discerning
perspective, are the fundamental interests and values of security;
3) Threats and concerns relative to the security of communities do not come only from
other States. They may also originate within the States and non-state actors;
4) Competition, cooperation, and the building of communities are equally relevant and
may coexist concurrently;
5) The emphasis or priority granted to each dimension/concern/threat, and to each
instrument of security, may vary from community to community;
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6) The generic concept of security must be abstract, inclusive, and cautious to
reconcile complexity, diversity, and change and to allow different levels.
Thus, security means the protection and promotion of values and interests considered
as vital for the political survival and well being of the community. The closer the
community is to the absence of concerns of political, economic, and military nature, the
more safeguarded its security is.
Having the community as reference means that the object of security may be a State,
an ethnic group, a transnational group or an international association, while
accommodating the problematic nature of States and the existence of other security
references "within" the States and/or “above” the States. At the same time, assuming
political survival and well being as vital values and interests, allows the broadening and
deepening of security beyond traditional dimensions, in a sufficiently inclusive and
flexible manner, in terms of its content, threats/risks, and instruments.
Concerns over political survival or well being may, independently or simultaneously, be
the fundamental interests communities can ensure, though not necessarily with the
same priority, in the same manner, at the same level, or in face of the same concerns:
North Korea, Kurds, Palestinians, Iceland, Angola, or the EU, will certainly consider
both their survival and their well being in vary different ways. Again, if the State is for
some the greatest reference of security, for others it constitutes the major source of
insecurity, while for others the major reference is not the State, but rather their ethnic
or religious group, or the political elite.
Moreover, if there is a crucial problematic of political survival or of well being, it may
not simply result from the conflict of material interests (such as territory, resources,
etc.) but arise, primarily or equally, from considerations and perceptions of identity,
either of ideological nature of historical and cultural heritage. Such problems and
perceptions occur also in very distinct contexts of rivalry, conflict, involvement, and
cooperation, which are dynamic and evolving.
Similarly, the safeguard and/or promotion of political survival and well being may imply
the orchestration of military panoply but, complementary or independently, may favour
internal or international normative/legal frameworks, diplomacy, politics, commerce
and economy, or social-cultural aspects and others. Again, it depends on the specific
community and circumstances. Accordingly, in the concept we propose, at the same
time that political survival and well being limit the spectrum of security (in order to
pose a security problem, a concern must, somehow, question values and interests
considered to be vital) they are also sufficiently inclusive and flexible to allow a great
variety of potential real situations. In similar fashion, the idea of community that
emerges in our concept of security not only allows encompassing several levels (infra-
state, state, and multinational), but also selecting those communities which may be
more relevant and pertinent in terms of the security agenda and of the system, or
security complex, under analysis. The same may be said regarding military, political,
and economic concerns, since they can only be included in the operational concept of
security depending on their relevance to the protection and promotion of interests and
values considered vital to the political survival and well-being of the communities in
question: of course, there are security concerns that do not threaten basic levels of
security of populations, States, or regions; otherwise, we would be inviting a
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tremendous array of potential communities and concerns that, in fact, are not of equal
relevance.
3. Systems of International Security
A distinct, although related, debate concerns the characterization of "systems of
international security". There are also very different perspectives and proposals on this
topic. For instance, while Muthiah Alagappa (1998: 54-56) described three types of
security systems he considers "pure" - competitive security, collective security, and
secur
ity community -, Raymo Vayren (1999) listed three different "perspectives" on
international security: common, cooperative, and collective. Patrick Morgan (1997),
however, identifies five "ideal types" of systems, or multilateral forms of conflict
management: power restraining power; alignment agreement of major powers;
collective security, pluralist community of security, and integration. In turn, Brian Job
(1997) goes further to subdivide the first into balance of power and collective defence,
while Gareth Evans (1993) maintains that common security, collective security, and
comprehensive security are different forms of cooperative security. Particular relevance
is, then, placed on concepts centred on competitive security, common security,
cooperative security, collective security, and security community.
In the traditional perspective, clearly inspired by realism, the international security
system is competitive by nature, rooted in self-defence/security of States in an
environment of conflict. In the perceived anarchical international structure, without
any superior authority to guarantee survival and mistrusting and fearing the ambition
of others, each State faces its own security as its main concern and assumes
responsibility for self-defence and self-security, in a traditional Hobbesian challenge of
order and competitive security. Even so, there are differences between the so-called
"offensive realism" and "defensive realism". John Mearsheimer, one of the most
distinguished authors of the "offensive" position, argues that «States are always
prepared to think offensively toward other States» (2001: 34). Kenneth Waltz (2001)
stresses a different viewpoint: States are not simply driven by “maximization of
power”, but also by maintaining their positions in the system and consolidating the
balance of power which, in the logic of “relative gains”, may be a source of international
stability.
The competitive nature of the system, however, does not erase the possibility of
cooperation among States on security and defence, or even the feasibility of a relative
"international order". It is within this framework that realism finds comfort in the
theories of collective defence (several States, confronted with a common threat from
another State or coalition, unite to consolidate their respective capabilities and better
defend themselves as a group, dissuade, or defeat the enemy/adversary), of balance of
power (stressing the permanent play of weight, counter-weight, and/or compensation,
primarily among the great powers), and of hegemony (stressing not only the ambitions
and attitudes of the great powers constantly seeking maximization of power, but also
the capabilities and potentialities/vulnerabilities of hegemonic power, which may be the
determining factor in achieving greater or lesser stability in the inherent system of
competitive security).
The common security approach gained some emphasis following the report "Common
Security: A Programme for Disarmament” by the Palme Commission (Independent
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Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues), in 1982, amidst the tense Cold War
context. Emphasizing the risks of escalation and the risks and limitations of unilateral
initiatives, the Commission called for a common compromise for survival and security
that would accommodate the legitimate interests of "others" as well as "ours". The
argument is that security must be reached with others, not against them: hence such
recommendations, like the creation of nuclear weapon free zones, mutual control of
strategic defence of space, disarmament of superpowers and their respective 'blocks" of
collective defence, and the strengthening of the United Nations and regional
organizations. For Gareth Evans (1993), the positive aspect of this idea, as defined by
the Palme Commission, is that it emphasizes common survival through security with
"the other side". However, he points out that a great deal of the debates over common
security has focused on aspects of military security and that is only one of many fronts
in a more inclusive cooperative security.
The cooperative security became very popular in Europe as a result of the 1975
Helsinki Accords and, primarily, since the end of the Cold War. Cooperative security,
however, has been defined and applied in different ways, although always based on the
premise that, in order to be respected, security cannot be imposed or reached by one
group on another and must be based on common institutions and norms. As a rule,
cooperative security is perceived as a regimen which prevents and manages conflicts in
a certain established framework of norms and procedures which imply accommodating
rival (or potentially rival) interests and politics to maintain a stable international order
under the leadership of the great powers (Vayryen, 1999: 57-58).
Muthiah Alagappa (1998: 53-54) further ascertains that relational identity in
cooperative security is not a negative thing or, if it is, it is only to a very small degree
and may, actually, be positive: States may be sceptic and distrustful of one another,
but there is not a perception of immediate threat. Gareth Evans (1993) presents a
rather broad concept of cooperative security that includes several forms of common
security, collective security, and comprehensive security. In this author's view, the
main virtue of cooperative security is that it provides a broad range of responses to
questions of security: the essence of cooperative security is based on the fact it
emphasizes cooperation over competition
3
. David Dewitt (1994) shares an equally
broad
concept of cooperative security, and includes in it the idea of comprehensive
security, competitive security, as well as the balance of powers and alliances.
Regarding collective security, G. Evans defines it as being inherently focused on
military issues, incorporating the idea that all members renounce the use of force
among them and agree to promptly assist any other member that may come under
attack. Collective security is, in this light, the corollary of common security, «the last
guarantee that the process will not stray from the course as the result of individual
aggressive behaviour by any State - or that if it does, the reaction will alter it» (Evans,
1993: 15-16). Likewise, in Vayryen's view, the purpose of collective security is to
3
G. Evans (1993) describes cooperative security as: 1) multidimensional in amplitude and gradual in
temper; 2) more inclusive than exclusive; 3) places more emphasis on the assurance of security than on
dissuasion; 4) it is not restrictive in terms of membership; 5) favors a multilateral approach over a
bilateral one; 6) does not favor military solutions over non-military ones; 7) It assumes that all States are
primary players in the security system while accepting that non-state players may have an important
role; 8) Does not request the creation of formal security institutions, though, naturally, it does not reject
them; 9) and, above all, it stresses the value of creating "dialogue habits" based on a multilateral
approach.
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create a virtual international coalition that will deter potential aggressors and, if
necessary, punish them through the use of force, but without prior definition of the
aggressor or the victim. It is anchored, primarily, on the premise of maintaining the
status quo by representing and mobilizing the international society, and calling for a
vast legitimate and representative measure of collective action. Therefore, a system of
this type requires «an established framework of institutions, norms, and procedures
that are helpful in mobilizing international response when necessary» (Vayryen, 1999:
59).
Brian Job, on the other hand, stresses the difference between collective security and
pluralist security society. The former refers to a compromise of the type "all-for-one"
among members in order to act, automatically and in synchrony, to assist a member
State under threat or attack by another State. According to this author, collective
security mechanisms, unlike collective defence, are not motivated by the need to plan
or act against a perceived external threat, that is, a State excluded from the group. In
this context the dilemma of security among members is attenuated, as there is not an
immediate, or clearly identified, threat. Thus, collective security frameworks have a
tendency to have a large range of participants, as they are designed to accommodate a
large common denominator in terms of attitudes and compromises. Their success
depends a lot on the degree of involvement and commitment of the most powerful
members of the group (Job, 1997: 172-173).
In Job's perspective, a higher level of cooperation is that of the pluralistic community of
security, where there is a deeper, and qualitatively higher, level of multilateralism and
institutionalism and where membership is more restrictive and very regulated. This
happens because the pluralist community of security presupposes the mutual
identification and identity development among participants, which is necessary to
materialize and sustain the principle of diffuse reciprocity on a long-term basis. More
importantly, the distinctive character of the security community is «the cognitive
transition that occurs among States, and which, in principle, does not encourage or fear
force as a means of interaction among themselves» (Job, 1997: 174-175). In M.
Alagappa's view, also, the "community of security" is deeper than cooperative security,
since it is more demanding in its premises and has a greater potential for preventing
the emergence of new disputes: «In a community security system, national identity
and national interest become fused with those of a larger community of states» (1998:
55). Therefore, there is no exception to the use of force among members of the
community and it becomes illegitimate as an instrument of politics among the States
that form it: in this perspective, security is collective by definition.
4. The notion of Security Complex
It is important to ascertain whether any, and if so which, of the aforementioned
syste
ms characterizes, on its own, the world reality, or that of specific macro-regions,
in an exclusive logic: in our view, not one but several of those systems may be
identified and overlap in the same international or regional framework, which justifies
the reference to a security complex. On the other hand, independently of the favoured
concept to characterize a certain framework, in a specific space and time, a security
system is only one of several in existence; it interacts with other systems and other
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units in a dynamic network of direct and indirect effects on the framework of
relationships reflected in the security environment.
Thus, the security complex may be understood as a system of security systems. More
specifically, the security complex is a network of linear and non-linear relationships
among multiple components and of interactions among several systems of security at
different levels, and of different dimensions, from which result certain patterns in
connections, structures, and behaviours that, in turn, interact with the internal and
external environments of that security network.
The concept of security complex is associated with the study and theories of complex
systems. It is a scientific field that permeates all areas of knowledge and which, in
short, focuses on «how parts of a system produce collective behaviours of the system
and how the system interacts with its environment» (New England Complex Systems
Institute – NECSI). There are five main ideas that are fundamental to the
understanding of the concept of systems complex and, therefore, of security complex:
system, pattern, network, scale, and linearity.
Naturally, the most important is the concept of system, inasmuch as we started by
defining "complex" as a "system of systems". According to Yaneer Bar-Yam (s/d) "a
system is the outlined portion of the universe which is separated from the rest by an
imaginary border... the key concept of ‘system’ is that, once it is identified, it
describes: the system’s properties, the properties of the universe beyond the system
which affect the system, the interactions/relationships among the parts of the system,
and between these components and the universe." The system is not isolated from the
environment; rather, it interacts with the environment. In some cases, it may be useful
to isolate the system. In other cases, one first focuses on the interactions/relationships.
Often, the identification of a certain security system stems from delimiting a certain
geographic space and focusing on the characteristics of interactions and/or how they
change. However, it is also possible to identify systems in a way that does not
correspond to spatial division: for instance, we may consider an economic system in
face of other systems (cultural, political, institutional, etc.) and downplay spatial
aspects.
Pattern corresponds, in short, to the idea of repetition - of structures, ideas,
behaviours, or, in ultimately, of systems within a broader collection of systems. One
simple way to understand a pattern is to detect repetition of behaviours or relationships
But we may also think of the pattern in terms of quantity and quality of repetitions: the
more often and coincidental those repetitions are the more solid or clear a particular
pattern is. Therefore, identifying patterns of security, understanding how they
interrelate, and observing their effects upon the group of systems, help us determine
the character of a certain security complex.
The network is the sum of connections that allow interactions and influences among the
parts (units and sub-systems) of the system complex. Sometimes, the designation of
network expresses, in itself, a system in its whole, considering the effects of these
connections. There are, obviously, many types of networks, but a fundamental aspect
to understand is that the parts are directly or indirectly connected among themselves;
subsequently, each network connection can be characterized by vectors such as force,
influence, substance, motivation, capacity, etc...Potentially, all networks have influence
over the interconnected components, other networks, and the network complex as a
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whole. The study and explanation of a security complex in a given region or in the
world involves, then, setting up networks amidst networks and players which implies
not only identifying the different networks and units, but also observing their effects
and establishing which behaviours and influences are common or different in the
multiple connections.
Scale refers both to the size of the complex under study and the scope of the impact of
units, networks, patterns, and systems, as well as the influence of the complex of
systems itself. In both instances - size and range of influence - a security complex
interconnects security of different scales, from intra-State levels to global security.
Scale is important both for purposes of definition and delimitation of the security
complex itself, and for measuring mutual impact at different levels. For that reason, all
other scales must be considered.
Finally, linearity is a recurring aspect in relationships of cause-and-effect. The concept
of linear relationship suggests that «two quantities are proportional between
themselves: if you double one, you must also double the other» (Bar-Yam, s/d). Linear
relationships are, in many cases, the first approach used to describe international
relations, despite the fact that there is not a single way to define what a linear
relationship is in terms of "content": for example, a linear relationship of historical
association and identity elements between the Popular Republic of China and Taiwan is
necessarily different from a linear relationship in an economic or political and diplomatic
perspective between the same countries. The problem is that, even taking into account
a great variety of linear relations, it is still very far from characterizing a system, and
even further from characterizing a complex system. Therefore, it is necessary to
consider, equally, the non-linear relationships, which are understood, simply, as those
which are not linear and greatly amplify the potential scope of causalities and
dependencies. Often, problems are very difficult to understand and resolve because the
relationships between causes and effects are not easy to establish: alterations in a
system 'here" have frequent consequences in a system "there", since the parts and
systems are interdependent. In other words, returning to the prior example, the
relationship between the PR China and Taiwan results from many sorts of relations
between the two, but at the same time, it also reflects and helps to stipulate
relationships, at different levels, between either country and the USA and other players
in Asia-Pacific and around the world. This means that the security complex is made up
of, and to some extent results from, the sum and convergence of linear and non-linear
relations with repercussions in the domain of security.
Conclusions
The concept of security proposed in this paper - meaning the p
rotection and promotion
of values and interests considered to be vital to the well-being and political survival of
the community, and considering that the closer the community is to the absence of
concerns of political, economic, and military nature, the more safeguarded its security
is may, admittedly, be the focus of criticisms and objections: open to abuses;
subjective and ambiguous; problematic in terms of "theoretical placement" and identity
of research agenda. However, any concept of security slightly more inclusive is virtually
exposed to criticism, and we cannot allow that to dissuade us from introducing what we
consider to be an operational concept. On the other hand, restricting a concept for the
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sake of great simplification would risk making it less adequate to reality, as we would
be forced, a priori, to consider exclusions independently of specific situations.
Consequently, and in the face of the need to make an option, we decided to pursue a
more open, inclusive, and flexible approach, in order to consider all the possibilities of
the highly complex and contested concept of security.
Moreover, the purpose of defining a concept is to indicate its essence and its
fundamental limits, and it must be the measured according to its applicability to
problem solving. In our view, the approach we propose expands and deepens the
concept of security without making it excessively inclusive, as it establishes important
parameters in terms of reference (community) and core values (political survival and
well-being); it does not restrict, a priori, the range of possibilities of interconnections
and the multiplicity of its vital parts; it permits to involve/ characterize different types
of concepts, divided in function of the reference and nature of threats, of instruments
and concerns; and it simplifies comparative analysis among different theoretical-
conceptual hypotheses, and between the latter the specific reality of security. At the
same time, it permits evaluating the most significant aspects and, if necessary,
establishes new interconnections.
Regarding the concept of "security complex" - defined as a system of systems and a
network of linear relationships among multiple parts, a system of interactions among
several systems of security, at different scales and dimensions, which result in several
patterns in connections, structures, and behaviours that, in turn, interact with the
internal and external environments of that security network - they clearly overlap the
multiple characterizations of the systems of security. In a specific space/dimension
where many and different units and systems interact, the impact is not only a certain
international/regional "order", but also a certain security complex, which eventually
comprises, simultaneously, elements of competitive security, collective security,
cooperative security, and security community. And, in fact, taking into account the
current international reality as a whole, there is not a system, but rather a complex of
systems of security.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 1, n.º 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 45-58
USING THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
A CHANGING PARADIGM
António Oliveira
Honours Degree in Military Sciences and a Master degree in Peace and War Studies. Military
Operations Officer at the Intervention Brigade (PRT) and lecturer at Instituto de Estudos
Superiores Militares. He has been involved in peace support missions, evacuation of national
citizens, and technical and military cooperation.
Abstract
The characteristics of current armed conflicts have grown i
n complexity, and the operations
carried out to solve them are often performed without the agreement of all of those
involved. Accordingly, the traditional use of military forces in the resolution of conflicts
seems to be undergoing a rapid evolution. In face of this mounting complexity, peace
operations began to be considered as broader “military operations” guided by principles that
in the past were limited to the execution of combat operations, materialized by the
implementation and application of a complex set of techniques and activities. In this new
paradigm, the same “peace” operation may comprise a wide range of activities, ranging
from conflict prevention to medium and high intensity fighting operations, and including also
parallel humanitarian support activities. For this reason, and in accordance with the concept
of employment and the functions to be carried out, the performance of the military forces in
current peacekeeping operations is based on the simultaneous completion of a set of tasks
that are required to attain the required final military goal. In the presence of the wide range
of tasks that need to be performed, a military force should have the resources and be
organized based on multiple capacities and characteristics. Areas that in the past used to
support the actual force have now assumed increased relevance and are perceived as being
crucial, given that the main role of military forces is that of creating and maintaining a safe
and stable atmosphere that enables the remaining sectors participating in the process to
act. In an integrated approach system to conflict, the aim is that military forces attain and
ensure safety conditions, and guarantee the necessary support so that other agents can
come up with the most appropriate solutions to address the causes of conflict.
Palavras-chave
Strategic context; Armed Forces; Military Instrument; Peace
keeping Operations; Conflict
Resolution
How to cite this article
Oliveira, António (2010) "Using the military instrument in conflict resolution: a changing
paradigm". JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, N.º 1, Autumn 2010. Consulted on
[online] date of last visit,
observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol1_n1_art4
Ar
ticle received in June 2010 and accepted for publication in August 2010